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In real life, many combinatorial optimization problems are solved by
simple algorithms (e.g., greedy, local search, thresholding, etc.) without any
provable guarantees on the performance of the returned solution compared to
the optimal one. Even though theoretical computer scientists have established
strong results for the performance of such algorithms in diverse settings, it is
not always easy to match the real life application to one of those well-studied
problems. That said, we also have power systems which is a rich source of com-
binatorial optimization problems. The combinatorial nature arises whether it
is turning switches on or off, assigning generation to different sources, schedul-
ing charging or discharging of electric vehicles, splitting loads between different
phases, or installing equipment at certain locations of the grid. On top of the
combinatorial nature, these applications usually entail another level of com-
plexity due to the nonlinearity of their objective and/or constraints.
vii
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I will try to bridge theoretical computer
science and power systems by utilizing tools from approximation algorithms
and mechanism design to provide rigorous guarantees for three problems in
power systems. Contributing to the intersection of these two fields is important
to both push the state-of-the-art approximation algorithms by introducing new
problems that cannot be solved with existing techniques, as well as provide
methods for both scalable and rigorous solutions to problems arising in real-
world power systems.
In the first problem, the goal is to minimize the power loss in a dis-
tribution network via changing the on/off status of switches in the network.
Bringing to bear recent advances in submodular optimization, we derive per-
formance bounds for a simple local-search algorithm that has been used in
practice for a long time. We then focus on special properties of the grid that
let us develop tailored algorithms with improved performance guarantees. Fi-
nally, we use our insights from our theoretical analysis to propose a general
heuristic for the network reconfiguration problem that is orders of magnitude
faster than existing methods in the literature, while obtaining comparable
performance.
In the second problem, we propose a novel way to use electric vehi-
cles as dynamic energy storage for supporting the power grid, by discharging
them at designated times and locations of need. We show that the underlying
scheduling problem is NP-hard and propose various approximation algorithms
with different performance guarantees.
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Finally in the last problem, we study a mechanism design problem for a
system operator who wants to optimally assign the demand to different energy
generators. We study this as a dynamic procurement auction, in which the
generators may go out of business if they are not frequently picked. Since this
will increase the electricity price in the long term, the system operator has
to design a mechanism that minimizes the overall cost via selecting different
sources frequent enough to maintain the competition. We show how to obtain
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Applications of combinatorial optimization are ubiquitous in real life,
e.g., routing, matching, scheduling, etc. Unfortunately, many of these prob-
lems are NP-hard, meaning that there are no efficient algorithms to solve
them exactly, unless P=NP. Therefore, we either have to resort to inefficient
algorithms, or settle for approximate solutions. Inefficient algorithms can be
useful when we deal with small instances of such problems, or when finding
the optimal solution is much more important than the time spent to find it
(for example, when we have to solve an instance just once, for a long-term
decision). However, when we consider the large amounts of data and the im-
portance of real-time decision making, for example in societal networks, there
is no solution but to relax the optimality requirement. This is the topic of
approximation algorithms, where we try to find “good enough” solutions in a
time that is polynomial in the size of the input. In fact, the dramatic increase
in the size of data has brought attention to linear and even sublinear algo-
rithms nowadays. But in this dissertation, we follow the convention that an
algorithm is efficient as long as its running time is polynomial in its input size.
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Power systems is one of the areas where many combinatorial optimiza-
tion problems appear. In the last decade, electricity networks have been facing
a major transformation, from traditional operating methods to more auto-
mated, distributed, optimized algorithms. The combinatorial nature arises
whether it is turning switches on or off, assigning generation to different
sources, scheduling charging or discharging of electric vehicles, splitting loads
between different phases, or installing equipment at certain locations of the
grid. On top of the combinatorial nature, these applications usually entail an-
other level of complexity due to the nonlinearity of their objective and/or con-
straints. In addition to the need for algorithm design to improve the efficiency
of electricity networks, the operation of these networks has also changed from a
unidirectional flow of energy (substations to users) to a bidirectional network
where everyone can buy or sell electricity. Consequently, many mechanism
design problems arise, as the users become decision-makers in this system.
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I will try to bridge theoretical computer
science and power systems by utilizing tools from approximation algorithms
and mechanism design to provide rigorous guarantees for three problems in
power systems. Contributing to the intersection of these two fields is important
to both push the state-of-the-art of approximation algorithms by introducing
new problems that cannot be solved with existing techniques, as well as provide




The first problem we study in this thesis is the distribution network
reconfiguration problem, in which the goal is to minimize the power loss in a
distribution network via changing the on/off status of switches in the network.
Since the distribution networks are acyclic and they should meet all demands,
the search space becomes the set of all spanning trees of the underlying graph,
which has exponential size in general. We show that this optimization problem
is NP-hard. However, simple algorithms have been used to solve this problem
for decades, without any performance guarantee. One of these simple algo-
rithms is a local-search algorithm known as branch exchange [1, 2]. Bringing
to bear recent advances in submodular optimization, we derive performance
bounds for the branch exchange algorithm. We do this by showing that the
distribution network reconfiguration problem is equivalent to minimizing a
supermodular function subject to a matroid base constraint.
We then focus on special properties of the grid, that let us develop
tailored algorithms with improved performance guarantees. For example,
we show that if the underlying graph is a 2-dimensional grid and the edges
have the same resistances, any shortest path tree would provide an O(√n)-
approximation, where n is the number of nodes. If in addition to the edges,
the loads are also uniform, we show how to achieve an O(1)-approximation
via an algorithm that we call Min-Min. Finally, we use our insights from our
theoretical analysis to propose a general heuristic for the network reconfigura-
tion problem that is orders of magnitude faster than existing methods in the
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literature, while obtaining comparable performance.
In the next part of this dissertation, we propose a novel way to use elec-
tric vehicles (EVs) as dynamic energy storage for supporting the power grid,
by discharging them at designated times and locations of need. As a bene-
fit of this support, the utility companies can differ their expensive equipment
upgrades, which could have been triggered by a few hours of violations in the
absence of this concept. Hence in our storage dispatch concept, the utility sets
up an agreement offering time and location varying rewards to a central plan-
ner for the dispatch of storage to utility designated locations of need. These
locations have been identified by the utility company as stress points, via their
periodic power flow analysis, and are equipped with discharging ports. The
planner then computes an optimal dispatch of which batteries to utilize where
and when to maximize its collected rewards, based on the varying battery
availabilities. These batteries can be either from EV owners who provide their
car in return of monetary compensation, or EV fleets owned/managed by cities
or ride-sharing companies.
Towards the theoretical development of our state-of-the-art concept,
we set up a mathematical model for the dispatch of a varying set of batteries
at multiple time, location and price-varying distribution nodes. We study
the computational complexity of this problem and show that this problem
is strongly NP-hard. We then propose three approximation algorithms with
worst-case performance guarantees of 1/3, 1/2 and 1−1/e ≈ 0.63. We further
demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed algorithms via numerical simulations
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and show that all three algorithms achieve an empirical performance between
82%-100%.
In the final part of this dissertation, we study a mechanism design
problem for a system operator who wants to minimize the long-term cost
of energy generation, by optimally allocating the demand to a set of energy
generators. In a myopic approach, which is somehow similar to the common
practice, the system operator picks the cheapest available sources everyday,
until the demand is met. The problem with this approach is that in a lot
of US markets, wind is typically the least expensive form of generation, thus
it is favored by the current selection mechanism over conventional generation
(nuclear, coal and gas). As a result, these conventional sources are gradually
being driven out of business due to underuse, and the lack of competition can
drive up the price in the future. As a result, this short-term cost-minimization
approach yields a higher long-term cost.
In reality, a less competitive generator whose economic viability is
threatened might be “saved” by the system operator, by entering a side con-
tract that guarantees it sufficient allocation and payment to help it remain
viable. Such contracts are currently done behind closed doors in an ad hoc
way, including the system operator’s decision which generators it considers
critical. To improve system efficiency and transparency, we make a first step
toward providing a framework for systematic allocation and payments that
minimize cost over multiple periods.
We study a dynamic model of procurement auction in which the system
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operator (buyer) repeatedly assigns the generation to a set of energy sources
(sellers). We introduce the notion of “abandonment”, meaning that a gener-
ator may go out of business and abandon the system if they do not receive
enough payment. We show that under this model, the system operator may
have to assign the generation to inefficient generators, in order to keep them
alive, maintain the competition, and minimize the overall generation cost. We
focus on threshold mechanisms for the system operator as a simple way to
achieve incentive compatibility. We then consider the optimization problem
of finding the optimal thresholds. We show that even though our objective
function does not have the optimal substructure property in general, if the
underlying distributions satisfy some regularity properties, the global optimal
solution lies within a region where the optimal thresholds can be calculated
with a simple greedy approach.
1.3 Background
In this section we present background material pertinent to the follow-
ing technical chapters.
1.3.1 Approximation algorithms
Throughout this dissertation, we will work with approximation algo-
rithms, defined as follows.
Definition 1.3.1 (Approximation Algorithm [3]). An α-approximation
algorithm for an optimization problem is a polynomial-time algorithm that for
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all instances of the problem produces a solution whose value is within a factor
of α of the value of an optimal solution. α is called the performance guarantee
of the algorithm, also known as approximation ratio or approximation factor.
According to this definition, a 1
2
-approximation algorithm for a max-
imization problem is an algorithm which always achieves at least half of the
optimal value. However, it is also common in the literature to measure the
ratio of the optimal value by the approximate solution (i.e., the inverse of the
above definition), which in that case the same algorithm would be called a
2-approximation. The notion used in each context should be clear by the type
of problem (minimization or maximization) and approximation factor being
greater/less than one.
1.3.2 Set functions and submodularity
Let V be a finite set, called the ground set. We use 2V to denote the
set of all subsets of V , called the power set. A set function f : 2V 7→ R is any
function that maps the elements of the power set (i.e., the subsets of V ) to
real numbers. Function f is said to be submodular if it has the diminishing
returns property, namely adding an element to a bigger set is less valuable
than adding it to a smaller set.
Definition 1.3.2 (Submodularity). A set function f : 2V 7→ R with a
ground set V is submodular if:
f(X ∪ {u})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {u})− f(Y ),
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for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ V , u ∈ V \Y .
Function f is said to be supermodular if −f is submodular (or the
above inequality holds in the other direction). Supermodularity captures an
increasing returns property. A function is said to be modular if it is both
submodular and supermodular.
Definition 1.3.3 (Monotonicity). A set function f : 2V 7→ R is said to be
monotone increasing if f(X) ≤ f(Y ) for any X ⊆ Y ⊆ V .
1.3.3 Matroids
Definition 1.3.4 (Matroid [4]). Let V be a finite set, and let I be a collection
of subsets of V . The pair M = (V, I) is a matroid if the following conditions
hold:
1. (Hereditary property) If B ∈ I, then A ∈ I for all A ⊆ B.
2. (Augmentation property) If A,B ∈ I and |A| < |B|, then there exists
v ∈ B\A such that A ∪ {v} ∈ I.
A set A ∈ I is called an independent set. The collection I is called the
set of independent sets of the matroid M. A maximal independent set (an
independent set that has maximum size) is a base of the matroid. It is easy
to show that all the bases of a matroid have the same number of elements.
The following theorem introduces an example of a matroid over the edges of
an undirected graph.
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Theorem 1.3.1 (Cycle Matroid [4]). Let G(V,E) be an undirected graph.
Define the set T to be the collection of all subsets of E that form a forest (i.e.,
the subset is acyclic). In other words, A ∈ T iff A ⊆ E and edges in A do not
form a cycle. Then M = (E, T ) is a matroid called the cycle matroid of graph
G (also known as graphic matroid).
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the distribution network reconfiguration problem
through the lens of submodular optimization. In this chapter, we show that
this problem is equivalent to minimizing a supermodular set function subject
to a graphic matroid base constraint. Using recent developments in submod-
ular optimization, we pioneer to provide the first performance bound for the
well-known branch exchange algorithm that has been used in practice for a long
time. Missing proofs of this chapter are provided in Appendix A. This chap-
ter concludes with numerical experiments that compare various algorithms
proposed for this problem in the literature.
Chapter 3 revisits the distribution network reconfiguration problem
with an algorithm design approach. The main contribution of this chapter
is to provide novel lower bounds and corresponding approximation factors for
various settings ranging from min{O(m − n),O(n)}1 for general graphs, to
1m,n are the number of edges and vertices in the graph, respectively.
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O(√n) over grids with uniform edge resistances, and O(1) for grids with uni-
form edge resistances and demands. The chapter concludes with extensive nu-
merical simulations that demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed algorithms.
Missing proofs of this chapter are provided in Appendix B.
Chapter 4 presents our new concept of using electric vehicles as mo-
bile energy storage systems. The chapter starts with the description of our
concept with its potential real-world impact, theory-to-concept and other im-
plementation considerations. We also propose in this chapter various approx-
imation algorithms to bring this concept to fruition. The chapter concludes
with numerical experiments that compare the performance of our proposed
algorithms.
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the dynamic procurement auction with aban-
donment, motivated by the problem of minimizing the cost of energy gener-
ation via a set of energy sources that have private viability constraints. We
prove in this chapter how the optimal mechanism can be achieved by a greedy
algorithm. Missing proofs of this chapter are provided in Appendix C.
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Chapter 2
Distribution Network Reconfiguration I:
a Submodular Framework
Distribution network reconfiguration (DNR) is a tool used by operators
to balance line load flows and mitigate losses. As distributed generation and
flexible load adoption increases, the impact of DNR on the security, efficiency,
and reliability of the grid will increase as well. Today, heuristic-based ac-
tions like branch exchange are routinely taken, with no theoretical guarantee
of their optimality. In this chapter, we consider loss minimization via DNR,
which changes the on/off status of switches in the network. The goal is to
ensure a radial final configuration (called a spanning tree in the algorithms
literature) that spans all network buses and connects them to the substation
(called the root of the tree) through a single path. We prove that the associ-
ated combinatorial optimization problem is strongly NP-hard and thus likely
cannot be solved efficiently. We formulate the loss minimization problem as a
supermodular function minimization under a single matroid basis constraint,
and use existing algorithms to propose a polynomial time local search algo-
rithm for the DNR problem at hand and derive performance bounds. We show
that our algorithm is equivalent to the extensively used branch exchange al-
gorithm, for which, to the best of our knowledge, we pioneer in proposing a
11
theoretical performance bound. Finally, we use a 33-bus network to compare
our algorithm’s performance to several algorithms published in the literature.1
2.1 Introduction
Distribution networks are usually built as interconnected mesh net-
works, but are normally configured (via switches) and operated as radial net-
works (i.e. trees, in graph theoretic terms), to simplify overload protection [6].
The entire network can be thought of as a forest consisting of rooted trees.
Each tree consists of a substation (root) and a number of customers (users)
that are serviced via so-called distribution feeders (distribution lines starting
at the substation). Switches located throughout the network allow dynamic
reconfiguration of the distribution network through switching operations; the
opening or closing of a switch corresponds to the removal or addition of an
edge, respectively.
The goal of distribution networks is to deliver the power from substa-
tions to users, but notably, substantial losses of up to 13% occur as electric
power flows over distribution lines [7]. As a result, Distribution Network Recon-
figuration is a major tool focusing on the dynamic identification of a spanning
tree that optimizes a performance measure such as load flow balancing or total
line loss minimization. We select the latter, namely the minimization of losses
1The content of this chapter has appeared in the proceedings of the 51st Hawaii Inter-
national Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) [5]. The author of this dissertation made
the primary technical contribution to this work.
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for a given hourly load flow, as the objective of the reconfiguration problem.
Similar issues in meshed transmission networks have been addressed in the
literature recently (see [8] and references therein).
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
1. We prove that the DNR problem is strongly NP-hard. We do this
through a polynomial reduction from 3-Partition problem, which is
defined in Section 2.4 (see [9] for more details). To the best of our
knowledge, the computational hardness of this problem has not been
studied so far.
2. We formulate the DNR problem as a supermodular minimization prob-
lem subject to a single matroid basis constraint (see Section 1.3 for the
definitions of supermodularity and matroid). Supermodularity is moti-
vated by the fact that losses are quadratic in the current flowing over
each branch of the distribution network. Furthermore, the matroid basis
constraint ensures the radial structure and guarantees that all the buses
are connected to the substation.
3. We observe that the local search algorithm for solving the supermod-
ular minimization problem is equivalent to the well-known branch ex-
change algorithm. Hence, we obtain the first theoretical result on why
the branch exchange algorithm performs well in practice.
The proposed submodular framework sheds some light on the algorithmic
structure of the optimization problems in distribution networks. Although
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in this chapter we are mostly providing a theoretical justification for an exist-
ing heuristic, this helps us to provide new algorithms in the next chapter. It
is also evident in other lines of work in energy systems (see [10–12] for exam-
ple) that the theoretical study of such problems can help to either find new
algorithms or improve the efficiency of existing ones.
2.2 Related Work
DNR has been studied extensively in the literature. One of the most
common heuristic algorithms is the branch exchange suggested by Civan-
lar et al. [1] and implemented by Baran and Wu [2], who considered loss
minimization and load balancing objectives. Starting from a feasible tree con-
figuration, the branch exchange algorithm transfers some loads in each iter-
ation by (i) closing an open switch to create a loop in the network, followed
by (ii) opening one of the closed switches in that loop to arrive at another
feasible solution with a lower cost. The algorithm terminates when no further
improvements are possible. This algorithm has been used as a benchmark
against different DNR algorithms with the 12.6kV network of Fig. 2.1 em-
ployed for numerical comparisons.
An improved branch exchange algorithm was proposed by Miguez et al.
[14] who tried to expand the space of available changes in the local search,
hence eliminating some local minima of the standard algorithm. The idea of
improved branch exchange is to investigate improvement from a pair of ex-
































































Figure 2.1: 33-bus network [13].
and Low [15] proposed an algorithm to do each step of branch exchange ef-
ficiently by solving only 3 optimal power flow equations (OPF), regardless of
the size of the network. Their algorithm helps to find the best switch to open
in order to minimize any convex increasing cost function, assuming that an
open switch has already been closed. These improvements still provide no
theoretical guarantee on the output of the branch exchange algorithm.
Unlike the branch exchange algorithm that maintains a tree structure
during its execution, there are other heuristic algorithms that start with the
meshed network (obtained by closing all the tie switches) or the disconnected
network (obtained by opening all the switches) and proceed to open/close
switches one by one until a radial configuration is achieved [16–18]. Shirmo-
hammadi and Hong [17] proposed one such algorithm that starts with the
meshed network and proceeds with iterations that open the switch with the
smallest current. No theoretical performance guarantees have been obtained
15
for this algorithm.
For small networks such as the 33-bus example of Fig. 2.1, the global
optimal configuration can be discovered by brute-force enumeration. An effi-
cient enumeration approach proposed in [19], lists all the spanning trees in a
clever way that generates each tree exactly once, and calculates losses by ad-
justing the losses of the previous spanning tree. The drawback of this method
is that it is not practical for larger networks, since a network has exponentially
many spanning trees [20].
The joint DNR and OPF problem was considered in [13] using Ben-
ders decomposition to decompose the global problem to master and slave
subproblems. The master level determines the binary variables by solving
a mixed-integer non-linear program using CPLEX. The slave level solves the
OPF non-linear program using the CONOPT solver. Again, solving integer
programs is computationally intractable for large networks.
Many other approaches like genetic algorithms [21, 22], particle swarm
optimization [6], ant colony algorithms [23], artificial neural networks [24, 25],
etc. have been utilized to solve this problem. A survey of different algorithms
for the DNR problem can be found in [7]. What is conspicuously missing in
all these previous works is a rigorous theoretical performance guarantee.
To close this gap, we consider a submodular approach to the DNR prob-
lem. Since switching binary decisions render DNR a non-linear combinatorial
optimization problem, additional structure like submodularity or supermodu-
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larity enables finding an approximate solution efficiently.
2.3 Problem Statement
In this section we present the power flow equations and employ some
simplifying assumptions to model the problem in graph theoretic terms. We
model the distribution network as a graph G(N , E), where N is the set of buses
(nodes) and E is the set of lines (undirected edges). We assume that a single
substation is located at node 0, and the other nodes are load buses with given
active and reactive power demands (pi, qi), for all i ∈ N\{0}. We are looking
for a spanning tree rooted at bus 0 (i.e., a tree that connects all the loads to
the root through a single path) which minimizes the total resistive loss.
Letting Vi = |Vi|eiθi represent the complex voltage at bus i, we adopt
the relaxed branch model of [15, 26] that allows us to ignore the phase angles of
voltages and currents in radial networks. Let Ze = Re+ iXe be the impedance
of line e ∈ E . We also use Sij = Pij + iQij to express the branch power flow
from bus i to bus j, and Iij to express the current from bus i to j. A summary
of our notation is depicted in Fig. 2.2.
Assumption 2.3.1 ([15, A2]). Voltage variation across the distribution net-
work can be neglected. Using per unit (p.u.) representation, we assume that
Figure 2.2: Power flow variables.
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|Vi| = 1 p.u. for all nodes i ∈ N .
This assumption is realistic since in practice voltage at every bus is
kept within an allowable range such as (0.95, 1.05) p.u., and impacts losses
(the objective function of DNR) at a smaller order of magnitude than different
spanning trees. Moreover, this assumption does not change significantly the
ordering of spanning trees based on the associated line losses.
Assumption 2.3.2. The impact of line losses on line flows is negligible relative
to the power demands at the buses of the network.
This assumption implies that the power flow on each line e ∈ E is almost
equal to the total demand of the buses that are receiving power through that
line. Specifically, for a given spanning tree, if we denote the set of successors








where pi and qi are the active and reactive power demands at bus i. Note that
by Pe we mean the power flowing on line e in the direction from the root of
the tree to the leaves (parent to child). In Section 2.6, we verify the validity
of these assumptions in detail.
If we denote the loss of line e = {i, j} ∈ E by Le, then we have:
Le = Re × |Iij|2. (2.2)
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In addition, in the relaxed model we have:
|Vi|2|Iij|2 = P 2ij +Q2ij. (2.3)




















Given a spanning tree (ST) we can sum up the line losses Le over all the edges
of the tree to find the total loss. Thus, the optimal reconfiguration problem

























where the minimization is over all the spanning trees of G(N , E).
2.4 Hardness Result
In this section we prove that the DNR problem is strongly NP-hard
in general by a reduction from the 3-Partition problem [9]. A computa-
tional hardness result is more powerful when it is derived for a more restricted
setting—since the hardness implication then holds for any generalization of the
setting. Here we derive a hardness result for the special case of unit demands,
where the objective function of the optimization problem (P1) reduces to a
simpler function that is just counting the number of successors. In particular
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we make the following assumptions:
Re = 1 ∀e ∈ E ,
pi = 1 ∀i ∈ N\{0},
qi = 0 ∀i ∈ N\{0}.






(number of successors of e in ST )2. (2.4)
Although these assumptions may not be realistic, they transform the problem
into an explicit combinatorial problem (without any power flow variable or
parameter) and help us to analyze the computational complexity of the re-
configuration problem. The resulting complexity applies then to more general
and realistic settings, as mentioned above.
We show that even the unit-demand case is strongly NP-hard. We
prove this by a reduction from the 3-Partition problem defined as follows.
Definition 2.4.1. (3-Partition) In the 3-Partition problem we have a
multiset of k = 3m integers summing to mB with each integer strictly between
B/4 and B/2. The task is to partition these numbers into m triplets each with
a sum of B.
It is well known that in the 3-Partition problem, deciding whether
a given multiset can be partitioned into balanced triplets or not, is strongly
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NP-complete, i.e., it is NP-complete even if the numbers are bounded by a
polynomial in the length of the input [9].
Theorem 2.4.1 (Hardness result). Distribution network reconfiguration
problem (P1) is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We propose a polynomial reduction from the 3-Partition problem to
the unit-demand case of reconfiguration problem (P2). Given an instance of
the 3-Partition problem we build an instance of the reconfiguration problem
such that the optimal spanning tree reveals the answer to the 3-Partition
problem (if it exists). Given k = 3m integers {a1, a2, ..., ak}, we construct a
network as shown in Fig. 2.3. There is a root r, m nodes u1, ..., um connected
to the root, k = 3m nodes v1, ..., vk each connected to all of ui’s (thus vi’s and





Figure 2.3: Polynomial reduction.
Lemma 2.4.3 below proves that all the lines between the root r and
the uj’s are part of the optimal tree. Moreover, all the lines between levels
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two and three appear in every spanning tree, so the only choices are on the
lines between levels one and two. In particular, we have to connect each vi to
exactly one uj, i.e., make one of m choices.
When we connect node vi to node uj, the corresponding edge gets a cost
of a2i , since there are ai− 1 nodes in level three and the edge has ai successors
including vi. This cost is independent of the choice of uj, so the total cost for
the edges between levels one and two is the same for all the spanning trees.
The cost to be minimized is thus the total cost of the edges between root r
and the uj’s. Let Sj be the set of indices of the children of uj, i.e.,
Sj = {i | (uj, vi) ∈ Tree},





































a2i + (mB − 3m). (2.5)
As mentioned earlier, the second and third terms are constants since they are
independent of the choice of the spanning tree. Using the fact that the Sj’s
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ai = m+mB = m(B + 1).
(2.6)






i=1 xi = C for a con-
stant C ∈ R is achieved when xi = C/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.





ai = B + 1 ∀j ∈ {1, ...,m},
and the optimal value is:




a2i + (mB − 3m).
Note that this optimal cost is achieved when ai’s are partitioned into m subsets
with sum B, but there is no restriction on the size of Sj’s. This means that
node uj can have any number of vi’s connected to it, while in the 3-Partition
problem we want to partition the ai’s into m triplets. The property B/4 <
ai < B/2 ensures that this minimum can only be achieved when |Sj| = 3 for















In conclusion, the algorithm for the unit-demand case finds the tree corre-
sponding to the 3-Partition answer (if it exists), and if it outputs some
unbalanced tree, this means that the 3-Partition does not exist. If each ai
is bounded by a polynomial in k, the constructed network has polynomial num-
ber of nodes, hence any polynomial time algorithm for the unit-demand case
provides a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for the 3-Partition problem
which is not possible unless P = NP .
Lemma 2.4.3 proves the only remaining part of the hardness proof.
Lemma 2.4.3. With uniform line resistances (Re = R, ∀e ∈ E), the optimal
tree includes all the edges adjacent to the root.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that we have an optimal tree
which does not choose edge (r, u) as shown in Fig. 2.4 on the left. Let W be
the total load weight of subtree connected to u (including u). Since we have
a tree, this subtree is connected to the root through another node v. Node v




Figure 2.4: Proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
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edges. Now we claim that this tree cannot be optimal since we can exchange
edge (u, v) with edge (r, u) and improve the objective value as shown in the
right tree. To see this, note that both edges (u, v) in the left tree and (r, u) in
the right tree have costs RW 2, but the exchange of (u, v) with (r, u) decreases
the load on all the edges of the path from r to v by W , hence decreasing the
total cost. This contradicts the optimality of the first tree.
Note that the unit-demand case is a special case of Lemma 2.4.3.
2.5 Submodular Framework
In the previous section we showed that DNR is strongly NP-hard, but
if we find some additional structure such as submodularity or supermodularity
in the problem, we may be able to provide approximation algorithms, which
provides a rigorous worst-case performance guarantee. Here we show that the
DNR problem has this structure.
2.5.1 Proposed framework
Considering the formulation of DNR (P1), the optimization problem is
over all the spanning trees of the original graph. We would like to encode the
two properties of “being a tree” and “touching all the vertices of the graph”
into a set of constraints. In order to do this, we need to define a set of variables
as follows. These variables also help to determine the successors of an edge in
any arbitrary tree.
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• For any edge e ∈ E we define a variable xe that indicates if that edge
is included in the tree or not (the number of variables is equal to the
number of lines in the distribution network).
• Corresponding to any variable xe, where e = {i, j}, we also define ykij
and ykji for all k ∈ N , which indicate the position of node k compared
to edge e = {i, j}. If there is a simple path from i to k including {i, j},
then ykij = 1 and if there is a simple path from j to k including {i, j},
then ykji = 1. In other words, y
k
ij = 1 means that edge {i, j} is chosen






The following theorem, inspired by the integer programming formulation for
the minimum spanning tree problem [27, 28], explains how we use these vari-
ables to characterize the spanning trees explicitly.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Feasible set characterization). There is a one-to-one
correspondence between the spanning trees of G(N , E) and the feasible set spec-
ified by the following set of constraints:
∑
e∈E
xe = n− 1 (2.7)
ykij + y
k









ji ∈ {0, 1} ∀e = {i, j} ∈ E ,∀k ∈ N (2.10)
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If we write the total loss as a function of the binary variables above,
we end up with an integer program formulation of (P1). For a given spanning
tree T (equivalently, a feasible set of values for the binary variables), and an
edge e = {i, j} ∈ T , the variables ykij and ykji induce a partition of the vertices
N into two sets which are exactly the two connected components of the tree
obtained by removing {i, j}. The set that does not include the root (assuming
vertex 0 is the root), is the set of successors of e in T . In other words, if
y0ji = 1, and succ(e) is the set of its successors, then we have:
succ(e) = {k ∈ N : ykij = 1}.
Note that y0ji = 1 is not an additional assumption, since the edges are not
directed, and hence for the edges in the tree, one of the pairs (i, j) or (j, i)
satisfies this condition.








































where the inner summations are over all nodes, but the ykij’s guarantee that
we only count the successors, and the term y0ji outside guarantees that we
calculate each edge of the tree exactly once and in the correct direction with
respect to the root.
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s.t. (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10).
(2.12)
Now we show that (2.12) is equivalent to a supermodular minimization problem
with a single matroid basis constraint. The objective function (2.11) is not
supermodular over E , but we create a similar set function that is supermodular
and is equal to (2.11) when constraints (2.7–2.10) hold (i.e., for spanning trees).
The following is a corollary of Theorem 1.3.1 which shows that the feasible set
in (2.12) is indeed a matroid basis constraint.
Corollary 2.5.2. Assuming that graph G is connected, the bases of the cycle
matroid M are the spanning trees of G, which all have cardinality |N | − 1.
Therefore, constraints (2.7–2.10) are equivalent to a single matroid basis con-
straint on E.




















The only difference between (2.11) and (2.13) is that we replaced the ykij’s with
zkij’s, and z
k
ij is defined similar to y
k
ij except that it can be any non-negative





i,j∈N :{i,j}∈E for simplicity.
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with {i, j} and going to k. Clearly, for spanning trees there cannot be more
than one path between any arbitrary pair of vertices, therefore zkij = y
k
ij and
this implies the equality of (2.11) and (2.13) when constraints (2.7–2.10) hold.
Theorem 2.5.3 (Supermodularity). Objective function (2.13) is a super-
modular set function over E, provided that the pi’s and qi’s are non-negative.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.5.2 Algorithm and analysis
In the previous section we showed that the DNR problem (2.12) is
equivalent to a supermodular minimization problem subject to a single ma-
troid basis constraint. Unless P = NP , it is not possible to approximate
the minimum of a supermodular function within any factor [29], in contrast
with the related problem of maximizing a submodular function which admits a
constant factor approximation algorithm [30]. We adapt the approximation al-
gorithm for the submodular maximization problem under matroid constraints,
proposed by Lee et al. [30], to solve the DNR problem, but we have to convert
the supermodular function to a non-negative submodular function (by negat-
ing and shifting). This conversion affects the multiplicative approximation
guarantee, as shown in Theorem 2.5.4. The algorithm, which is based on local
search, is described in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm starts with an arbitrary spanning tree T . Then at each
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Algorithm 1 Distribution Network Reconfiguration for Loss Minimization
1: Input: Configuration G(N , E), bus demands (pk, qk), line resistances
(Rij), ε.
2: Output: Spanning tree for minimizing the total loss.
3: Initialize T with an arbitrary spanning tree.
4: while 1 do
5: if there exist e ∈ E\T and e′ ∈ T such that (T\{e′})∪{e} is a spanning
tree and f((T\{e′}) ∪ {e}) < (1− ε)f(T ) then





iteration, it looks for two edges e ∈ E\T and e′ ∈ T such that swapping those
two edges makes another spanning tree with loss at most (1− ε)f(T ). If such
a pair exists, it updates T and repeats the exchange process, otherwise the
algorithm terminates and outputs the locally optimal spanning tree.
Theorem 2.5.4 (Performance guarantee). Let Talg be the output of Algo-
rithm 1, and T ∗ be the optimal spanning tree, i.e., T ∗ = argmin{f(T ) : T ⊆
E , T is a spanning tree}. Let M = f(E), which is an upper bound on f(A) for
all A ⊆ E, then:






M − f(T ∗)
)
. (2.14)
Proof. This is a corollary of [30, Theorem 22], which provides a (1
6
− ε)-
approximation algorithm for maximizing any non-negative submodular func-
tion over bases of a matroid M.3 Here we use M − f(A) as the non-negative
3That theorem requiresM to have at least two disjoint bases. We can solve this (if nec-
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submodular function, and the spanning trees are the bases of the cycle matroid
discussed in Theorem 1.3.1.
Even though Algorithm 1 is based on the local search approximation
algorithm for maximizing non-monotone submodular functions [30], it is equiv-
alent to the branch exchange heuristic algorithm which has been used since
the late 1980s [2]. This establishes that Theorem 2.5.4 provides the first proof
of a performance bound, and hence a performance guarantee for the branch
exchange algorithm.
2.6 Simulation Results
Table 2.1 shows the results of our experiments on the 33-bus network
of Fig. 2.1. The parameters of the network can be found in [6]. All the
active and reactive power demands are positive for this network as assumed in
Theorem 2.5.3. The simulations have been done by using the MATPOWER
package in Matlab [31]. The results show that in this case, our submodular
approach finds the globally optimal configuration, which was found in [19] (by
enumerating all 50751 spanning trees). In [2], 2 different approximate power
flow methods with different accuracies have been used and we also believe
that there are inconsistencies regarding the parameters of the network in the
essary) by adding dummy edges with very high resistances (to make sure that the algorithm
never selects them). Moreover, their algorithm performs another local search which allows
deletion of elements, but that run yields the empty set in our case (due to the monotonicity),
hence does not apply to the DNR problem.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of different DNR algorithms on the 33-bus network of Fig. 2.1
Algorithm Method Open Lines Loss (kW)
Proposed Submodular Local Search 7, 9, 14, 32, 37 139.552
Morton, Mareels [19] Brute-Force 7, 9, 14, 32, 37 139.552
Gomes et al. [16] Greedy on Mesh Network 7, 9, 14, 32, 37 139.552
Khodr, Martinez [13] Benders Decomposition 7, 9, 14, 32, 37 139.552
Wu et al. [23] Ant Colony 7, 9, 14, 28, 32 139.976
Shirmohammadi [17] Optimal Current Pattern 7, 10, 14, 32, 37 140.279
Baran, Wu [2]4 Branch Exchange 11, 28, 31, 33, 34 146.832
Initial Configuration 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 202.670
literature4; that is why results reported in [2] differ from what we obtained
by Algorithm 1. Clearly, the output of the local search algorithms depends
on the initialization. We used the initial configuration (Fig. 2.1) as the initial
spanning tree in our simulation. Further, to check the robustness with respect
to the initial tree, we repeated the simulations with 1000 random initial trees,
all of which ended with the same optimal solution. In order to check the
validity of our assumptions (see the problem formulation in Section 2.3), we
compare the losses of spanning trees as measured in (P1) with the exact losses
obtained from MATPOWER. The result is shown in Fig. 2.5. The blue line
is the exact loss curve where the spanning trees are sorted in the order of
increasing total loss. The red dots also show the loss for each tree obtained
from the simplified model. We observe that the approximate loss is generally
increasing, which means that it can be used in the local search algorithm.
In fact performing the local search with either exact loss or approximate loss
4The resistance of the branch between bus 6 and bus 7 is 0.7114Ω in [2], but 1.7114Ω in
[6]. We used the latter value in all our simulations.
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Figure 2.5: Comparing losses from the simplified model with the exact values.
results in the same globally optimal tree, reported in Table 2.1. As expected,
approximate loss estimates are less accurate for trees with higher losses, since
the resistive losses approach the order of magnitude of load demands in such
networks (hence contradicting Assumption 2). On the other hand, for trees
with smaller losses (which are indeed the target of our optimization problem)
the simplified loss approximates the exact loss very well.
Fig. 2.6 also compares the rank of the top 5000 spanning trees based on
the exact and approximate losses. Ideally, we would like the simplified losses
to preserve the rankings (which would result in a y = x line in this plot). We
observe that no single spanning tree faces a significant change in its ranking.
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Figure 2.6: Rankings based on exact and approximate losses for the best 5000
spanning trees.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the distribution network reconfiguration
problem for loss minimization through a submodular optimization approach.
We proved that this problem is NP-hard even if the demands and the line re-
sistances are all equal to one. We formulated this problem as a supermodular
minimization problem subject to a matroid basis constraint. We then used the
algorithm for maximizing non-monotone submodular functions under matroid
constraints, to give a polynomial time algorithm for the DNR problem with a
performance guarantee. The algorithm was equivalent to the branch exchange
algorithm that was known previously, but for which no theoretical guaran-
tees were available. By discovering a submodular structure in the problem,
we pioneered the derivation of a performance bound on the branch exchange
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algorithm.
In the next chapter, we try to propose direct combinatorial algorithms
for the distribution network reconfiguration problem, compared to using the
existing results from submodular optimization. This allows us to prove multi-
plicative constant factor approximation results, compared to the performance
bound of Theorem 2.5.4 which includes the upper bound M .
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Chapter 3
Distribution Network Reconfiguration II:
Algorithm Design
In this chapter, we revisit the distribution network reconfiguration prob-
lem from Chapter 2 which seeks to find a spanning tree T such that the loss of
the electrical flow over T is minimized. The tree requirement on the support
of the flow is motivated by operational constraints in electricity distribution
networks. The bulk of existing results on convex optimization over vertices of
polytopes and on the structure of electrical flows do not easily give guarantees
for this problem, while many heuristic methods have been developed in the
power systems community as early as 1989 [32]. The main contribution of this
chapter is to give the first provable approximation guarantees for the network
reconfiguration problem. We provide novel lower bounds and corresponding
approximation factors for various settings ranging from min{O(m−n),O(n)}
for general graphs, to O(√n) over grids with uniform resistances on edges,
and O(1) for grids with uniform edge resistances and demands. To obtain the
result for general graphs, we propose a new method for (approximate) spec-
tral graph sparsification, which may be of independent interest. Using insights
from our theoretical results, we propose a general heuristic for the network re-
configuration problem that is orders of magnitude faster than existing methods
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in the literature, while obtaining comparable performance.1
3.1 Introduction
Electricity distribution and transmission networks have been a rich
source of non-convex problems with combinatorial structure that have helped
discover limitations of, as well as advance, the theory of discrete and continu-
ous optimization [34–36]. In this chapter, we revisit the distribution network
reconfiguration problem which seeks to find a rooted tree such that the energy
of the electrical flow over the tree is minimized.2
For simplicity of presentation, we assume in this chapter that all the
demands are real numbers, denoted by di. However, this is without loss of gen-
erality and all our approximation guarantees hold for the more general case
of d = p + iq. In the general case, the objective function can be decomposed
into two additive parts, in which one is only a function of real demands (p),
and the other is only a function of the reactive part (q). The reason why our
approximation guarantees still hold is that our proposed solutions would guar-
antee the same approximation factor for both parts of the objective. Moreover,
here we assume that the demands are known parameters, while we discuss the
extensions of our results to the stochastic demand case in Appendix B.3.
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) (|V | = n, |E| = m), root r ∈ V ,
1The content of this chapter has been published in the Mathematical Programming
journal (MAPR) [33]. The author of this dissertation made major technical contributions
to this work.
2We use energy and loss interchangeably.
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resistances re > 0 for each edge e ∈ E, real demands di ≥ 0 for each node
i ∈ V \{r} supplied by the root node, thus dr = −
∑
i∈V \{r} di, the distribu-














fe = di, ∀i ∈ V, (3.2)
support(f) is acyclic, (3.3)
where δ+(v) and δ−(v) denote the sets of incoming and outgoing edges of
v (after fixing an arbitrary orientation on the edges), f is any feasible flow
satisfying the demands (3.2)3, the support of f is constrained to be acyclic (and
therefore, a tree rooted at r) (3.3), and the objective (3.1) is to minimize the
energy of the flow. While there may be more than one feasible flow satisfying
the demands in general, an electrical flow minimizes the energy subject to
meeting the demands. Moreover, given an r-rooted tree, there is a unique
flow f on the tree that satisfies the demands: fe =
∑
i∈succ(e) di, where succ(e)
is the set of nodes that connect to the root through e. Also, note that any
r-rooted tree can be augmented to be a spanning tree in the graph at no
additional cost.4 Therefore, the network reconfiguration problem (3.1) can
3Here we use a simplified linear flow model, similar to [37]. In reality, power flow equa-
tions are nonlinear and result in non-convex optimization problems [38–41]. We refer the
reader to a recent survey on relaxations and approximations of power flow equations [36].
In contrast, here we aim to relax the non-linearity of the power flow model, and instead
focus on the combinatorial aspect of the optimization problem in (3.1).
4By contracting the support of the existing flow and adding edges with 0 flow to construct
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where T is the set of all spanning trees of G.
In this chapter, we provide a provable approximation guarantee for
the network reconfiguration problem (P2). We delve deeper into the problem
structure to construct novel lower bounds and give new ways of graph spar-
sification while maintaining original edge-resistances. Our theoretical insights
also lead to a significant improvement in computation. The main contributions
of this chapter are the following:
(a) Flow Relaxation and new RIDe algorithm: We first relax the spanning
tree constraint, reducing the problem to finding a minimum energy elec-
trical flow; we call this the flow relaxation. In Section 3.4, we construct
instances that have a gap between the energy of the optimal tree and the
flow relaxation of the order Θ(
√
n/ log n) over grid graphs and Θ(∆) in
general graphs, where n and ∆ are the number of nodes and maximum
degree in the graph (which can be linear in n) respectively. Further,
we propose a randomized iterative edge-deletion algorithm, RIDe, that
sparsifies the graph by deleting edges sampled according to a specific
probability distribution dependent on the effective resistances of remain-
ing edges. We show that this method can guarantee O(m− n) approxi-
a spanning tree.
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mation with respect to the flow relaxation. This technique of sparsifying
graphs may be of independent interest.
(b) New Lower Bounds: We next exploit the combinatorial structure of the
graph to obtain novel lower bounds in Section 3.5. We first show that
any shortest-path tree, with respect to resistances, gives an O(n) ap-
proximation. Though a simple argument, this is already better than the
O(m2 − m) bound using [42] and the approximation using RIDe for
dense graphs. Second, we show that we can improve this approximation
factor by finding a laminar family of cuts. In particular, for certain grid
instances that have uniform edge resistances, a selection of laminar cuts
gives an O(√n)-approximation. These results serve as preliminaries for
our second combinatorial algorithm Min-Min explained next.
(c) Constant-factor approximation using new Min-Min algorithm: Real-life
distribution networks often resemble subgraphs of mesh-like networks.
For such networks, like grid graphs with n nodes and uniform demands,
the above mentioned techniques, are able to provide only an Ω(
√
n/log n)
approximation. Motivated by this, we construct a purely combinatorial
algorithm Min-Min in Section 3.6, that finds a specific shortest path
tree over an n×n grid with uniform resistances and a root at one of the





approximation when the demands are in [dmin, dmax]. In particular, for
uniform demands Min-Min gives an asymptotic 2-approximation.
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(d) Layered Matching Heuristic and Computational Results: Inspired by
the algorithmic ideas in Min-Min, we next propose a layered matching
heuristic, LM-Heuristic. This heuristic can be used to find approximate
solutions in the most general setting, without assumptions on the struc-
ture of network, resistances or demands. Using computational experi-
ments over randomly sparsified grid networks, we find that LM performs
very well in practice. In addition, the algorithms proposed in this chap-
ter take orders of magnitude less time than the best known heuristic for
this problem, the branch exchange heuristic, while obtaining comparable
performance. For example, on 25× 25 grid instances with sparsification
probability p = 0.2, the mean time taken by LM is 1.35 seconds, whereas
the mean time it takes the Branch Exchange heuristic to attain the same
cost as LM is around 10 hours. We believe this improvement will be cru-
cial in enabling system operators to reconfigure distribution networks
more frequently in practice.
3.2 Related Work
Network reconfiguration problem requires minimizing a quadratic func-
tion over the vertices of the general flow polytope (Theorem 7.4 in [43]). In
particular, if all the resistances are uniform, then the problem is equivalent
to finding a vertex with the smallest Euclidean norm, which is known to be
NP-hard (see for example Lemma 4.1.4 in [44]). For general polytopes, the
best approximation one can hope to get in polynomial time, for minimizing a
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general strongly convex function over integral points in a polytope is O(n2−n)
where n is the dimension of the polytope [42].
Besides distribution networks, switching problems have also been stud-
ied in electricity transmission networks, such as optimal transmission switch-
ing [45–47] and maximum transmission switching [48]. Despite the hard-
ness of these problems [49, 50], Grastien et al. [48] show how to achieve a
2-approximation for maximum transmission switching on cacti graphs. How-
ever, for transmission networks there is no requirement on the support to be
acyclic, thus making our problem structurally very different from those above.
In the network reconfiguration problem, relaxing the tree constraint
(3.3) results in the well-studied problem of computing electrical flows as they
uniquely minimize energy [51–53]. However, existing results in spectral spar-
sification [54, 55], that sparsify a graph without changing the energy much, do
not extend to our setting since they change the resistances on the remaining
edges to compensate for edge deletions. Many existing heuristics involve iter-
ative edge-deletion (e.g., [32]) using the electrical flow values in the resultant
graph, but offer no provable guarantees.
Another relevant approach in the electric flows literature, entails low
stretch trees. Given a weighted graph G, a low-stretch spanning tree T is
a spanning tree with the additional property that it approximates distances
between the endpoints of any edge in G. In particular, the stretch of an edge
e = (u, v) is the ratio of the (unique) shortest path distance between u and
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v in T to re (the weight of edge e in G).
5 Furthermore, the total stretch of
T is defined as the sum of the stretch of all edges in G. Kelner et al. [52]
show that for any tree, the gap between the energy of the flow in that tree
and the flow in the original graph, is at most the total stretch of that tree.
Naturally, one may wonder if there exists a low value for the (total) stretch
such that all graphs have a spanning tree with that stretch. The answer to
that question is unfortunately no. Abraham and Neiman [57] show that one
can construct a spanning tree T for any connected graph with total stretch
at most O(m log n log log n) in near-linear time (Theorem 2.11 in [52]); this
bound is tight up to an O(log log n) factor because Alon et. al [59] show that
the total stretch is Ω(m log n) for certain graph instances. Thus, this implies
that the energy cost of T is at most Õ(m) times that of the original graph.
We improve upon this approximation result using our RIDe algorithm.
3.3 Preliminaries
Relaxing the support constraint in the network reconfiguration problem
reduces the problem to computing an electrical flow, that we refer to as the flow
relaxation. Electrical flows have been shown to be efficiently computable in
near-linear time [37, 51, 53, 60], used to speed up the computation of maximum
5We follow the definition of Elkin et al. [56], but this definition slightly differs in the
denominator from others given in the literature. Abraham and Neiman [57] and Abraham
et al. [58] define the stretch as dT (u,v)dG(u,v) , where dG is the shortest-path metric on G with
respect to the edge weights. Note that these definitions are equivalent if the edge weights
are uniform.
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flow [60], and even bound the integrality gap of the asymmetric traveling
salesman problem (ATSP) [61]. We give a brief review of preliminaries on
electrical flows, that will be useful in understanding the results in this paper.
Let G = (V,E) be a connected and undirected graph with |V | = n,
|E| = m. Let B ∈ Rn×m be the vertex-edge incidence matrix upon orienting
each edge in E arbitrarily. Let R be an m×m diagonal resistance matrix where
Re,e = re. A key matrix that will play a fundamental role in the analysis of
our algorithms is the weighted Laplacian L := BCBT , where C = R−1. It
is well known that if G is connected, the only vector in the nullspace of the
Laplacian L is the all-ones vector 1.
In what follows, we will invert the Laplacian matrix using the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse denoted by L†; in which case LL† is a projection matrix
that projects onto the span of the columns of L, which we denote by im(L).
Let b ∈ Rn be the feasible node-demand vector. The optimality conditions of
the flow relaxation problem imply the existence of a vector of potentials on
the nodes (dual variables) φ ∈ Rn such that φ = L†b (this is well-defined since
1T b = 0) and the optimal electrical flow f = CBTφ. Using these facts, one can
show that the optimal energy E(f) = RTfR = φTLφ = bTφ = bTL†b. For any
pair of vertices u, v the effective resistance Reff(u, v) is the energy of sending
one unit of electrical flow from u to v. In particular, for any vertex u ∈ V , if
we let 1u ∈ Rn be the characteristic vector of u, then Reff(u, v) = χTuvL†χuv,
where χuv = 1v −1u and can be thought of as the demand vector in this case.
While the above notation suffices for our purposes, for more background on
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electrical flows, we refer the reader to comprehensive book chapters in [62] and
[63]. We next discuss our novel randomized iterative edge-deletion algorithm,
RIDe, that rounds a fractional point (i.e., minimum energy flow, relaxing the
support constraint in (3.1)) in the flow polytope, while maintaining a provable
increase in the energy.
3.4 A Randomized Iterative Edge-deletion Algorithm
The key idea of our RIDe algorithm is to delete edges iteratively fol-
lowing a specific probability distribution, while maintaining the graph connec-
tivity, until the resultant graph is a spanning tree. This is done as follows:
sample an edge e at random to delete from the graph with probability pe
proportional to 1 − ceReff(e), where ce = 1/re is the conductance of an edge.
The normalization constant of this probability distribution is known to be
∑
e∈E(1 − ceReff(e)) = m − (n − 1) (see for instance [64]). Intuitively, the
quantity ceReff(e) fully characterizes the graph’s ability to reconfigure the flow
upon deleting edge e (as we show later in Lemma 3.4.4). In particular, the
smaller the ceReff(e) (thus, the larger probability of deleting the edge), the
better the graph’s ability to re-route the flow of edge e upon deleting the edge,
without significantly increasing the energy. Moreover, this sampling procedure
ensures that connectivity is maintained, since pe = 0 for any bridge edge e, as
in such a case we have Reff(e) = re. To implement this algorithm efficiently,
we will show that the resultant graph Laplacian and effective resistances can
be efficiently updated after every deletion. We give the complete description
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Algorithm 2 Randomized iterative deletion (RIDe) algorithm
Input: A graph G0 = (V,E) and resistances r : E → R++.
1: for k = 0, . . . ,m− n do
2: Compute R
(k)
eff (e) for all e ∈ E, i.e., the effective resistance for each e in Gk
3: Sample edge e ∈ E according to probabilities p(k)e = (1−ceR(k)eff (e))/(m−k−(n−1))
4: Gk+1 ← Gk \ {e}
5: end for
Return: Spanning tree T = Gm−n+1
of the algorithm in Algorithm 2.
We will also show that RIDe gives an O(m− n) approximation factor
in expectation with respect to the cost of the flow relaxation. This is the
first approximation guarantee for randomized edge deletion heuristics (such as
[32]), to the best of our knowledge.
Theorem 3.4.1. The randomized iterative edge-deletion algorithm, RIDe,
gives an O(m − n) approximation in expectation with respect to the cost of
the flow relaxation E(fG) on the given graph G. In particular, E[E(fT )] ≤
E(fG)(m− n+ 2).
Note that the above theorem implies that for planar graphs, RIDe
gives an O(n) approximation (since number of edges is linear in the number of
nodes). In general, it seems one cannot obtain better than Ω(n) performance
using rounding of electrical flows, unless the flow relaxation is strengthened
using new inequalities. For instances with maximum degree ∆, the gap from
the flow relaxation can be Ω(∆). Consider a graph with two nodes r, t (r
is the root, and t is the only node with positive demand, say 1 unit) with
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Figure 3.1: The electrical flow on two graph instances, where all edges have unit
resistance, the root is node r, node t has unit demand and all other nodes have zero
demand.
n− 2 edge-disjoint paths between them; see Figure 3.1 (left). In this case, the
electrical flow sends 1/∆ units of flow along each of the ∆ disjoint r-t paths.
The energy of the electric flow is then Θ(1/∆), however, the energy of the
optimal spanning tree is 2. Therefore, the gap from flow relaxation can be as
large as Ω(n), since ∆ can be as large as Θ(n).
Moreover, the gap of the optimal tree compared to the flow relaxation
can be large even for graphs with small ∆. Consider a
√
n×√n grid (with n
nodes) where the root r is in the top left corner, all edges have unit resistances,
the node in the bottom right corner, call it t, has a demand of one, and all
other nodes (excluding the root) have zero demand; see Figure 3.1 (right) for
an example (here ∆ = 4). Recall that the potential drop between r and t
on sending one unit of current from r to t is equal to the effective resistance
Reff(r, t) between r and t. Hence, using Ohm’s Law this implies that the energy
of the electrical flow is equal to Reff(r, t). In this instance, it is known that
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n ≤ Reff(r, t) ≤ 2 log
√
n.
Furthermore, the cost of any optimal tree is 2(
√
n− 1), since any r-t path has
hop-length 2(
√
n−1) and the path from r-t can be grown into a spanning tree
without incurring any additional cost. Combining these two facts, we get the







Even existing work on analyzing the stretch of trees that has been used
to bound the energy of a tree with respect to the flow relaxation [52], does
not give compelling approximation bounds, since there exist instances with
stretch at least Ω(m log n) [59]. We next present details of our sparsification
approach followed by the analysis of RIDe.
3.4.1 Iterative edge deletions and updates
Before we delve into the proof for the performance of RIDe, we dis-
cuss one of the main components in designing and analyzing the algorithm:
determination of how the energy of the electrical flow changes after deleting
an edge from the graph. As mentioned in preliminaries, electrical flows are
fully determined by the Laplacian and its pseudoinverse. Thus, to determine
how electrical flows change upon edge deletions, we first obtain a closed form
expression for how the Laplacian pseudoinverse changes from one iteration to
6We will improve upon this factor in Section 3.6.2.
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the next. The following lemma provides a formula for updating pseudoinverses
following rank-one updates.
Lemma 3.4.2 (Theorem A.70 in [66]). Suppose that A ∈ Rn×n is symmetric
matrix, u, v ∈ Rn are vectors in im(A), and 1− vTA†u 6= 0. Then
(A− uvT )† = A† + A
†uvTA†
1− vTA†u. (3.4)
Now if the rank-one update corresponds to deleting an edge, we can
show the following update rule.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let L be the weighted Laplacian (weighted by conductances)
of a connected graph G = (V,E) and L† be the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse
of L. Let G′ = G \ {e} be the graph obtained by deleting an edge e ∈ E that
does not disconnect G. Then the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of the weighted
Laplacian of G′ is:







Proof. See Appendix B.1.
We can now use Lemma 3.4.3 to obtain a closed form expression for
how the energy increases from one iteration to the next. Suppose that we have
performed k iterations and deleted k edges from the original graph G to get
a modified connected graph Gk = (V,Ek) with m − k edges. Let Bk, and Lk
respectively be the incidence and Laplacian matrices of Gk. Also, Let fk(e)
and R
(k)
eff (e) respectively be the electrical flow and effective resistance for edge
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e in iteration Gk. Now, in the (k + 1)
th iteration we wish to delete another
edge e from Gk to obtain a connected graph Gk+1. We want to determine how
much E(fk+1) changes compared to E(fk).
Lemma 3.4.4. Assume Gk is connected and Gk+1 = Gk \ {e} is obtained by
deleting an edge e from Gk such that Gk+1 is also connected. Then E(fk+1)
can be recursively obtained from E(fk) using





Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.4.2 Performance of RIDe algorithm
We are now ready to present the proof for Theorem 3.4.1.
Proof. Let Gk = (V,Ek) be the resultant graph in iteration k after k edges
have been deleted, and let E(fk) be the energy of the electrical flow in Gk. In





m− k − n+ 2
)
(3.7)
and that Gk remains connected throughout the iterations of the algorithm
by induction on k (0 ≤ k ≤ m − n + 1). The base case when k = 0 holds
trivially. For the inductive step assume the result holds true for all iterations
k < m − n + 1. Now consider iteration k + 1 of the RIDe algorithm applied
to the graph Gk. Recall that we sample an edge e ∈ Ek at random to delete
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(m−k)−(n−1) . Since by the induction
hypothesis Gk is connected, and this sampling procedure does not disconnect
the graph, Gk+1 is also connected. Moreover, we could use Lemma 3.4.4 to
compute the expected increase in energy upon deleting edge e (which does not
disconnect the graph), where





To that end, let Z(k) be a random variable denoting the increase in the energy
from iteration k to k + 1. In particular, upon deleting an edge e ∈ Ek that
does not disconnect Gk, we have Z
(k)
e = refk(e)
2/(1 − ceR(k)eff (e)). Also, let
E ′k = {e ∈ Ek | p(k)e > 0} be the set of edges that are not bridges. Then, since
E ′k ⊆ Ek we have












(m− k)− (n− 1)
≤ E(fk)
m− k − n+ 1 ,
which in turn gives, using iterated expectations:
E[Z(k)] = E[E[Z(k) | Ek]] ≤
E[E(fk)]
m− k − n+ 1 .
Therefore,









m− k − n+ 2
)(
m− k − n+ 2





m− (k + 1)− n+ 2
)
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where we used the induction hypothesis in the second inequality. This con-
cludes the induction and proves the correctness of the algorithm. Lastly, to
obtain the final expected cost of the algorithm, we use (3.7) with k = m−n+1
to obtain E[E(fm−n+1)] ≤ E(f0)(m− n+ 2), as claimed. Since the cost of the
optimal spanning tree is lower bounded by the cost of the flow relaxation,
E(f0), the result follows:
E[E(fT )] ≤ E(fG)(m− n+ 2),
where E(fT ) is the energy of the tree T returned by RIDe and E(fG) is the
energy of the flow relaxation.
Note that the above approximation factor is with respect to the flow
relaxation, which is a loose lower bound as discussed previously. For planar
graphs in particular, the gap between the optimal solution and the flow relax-
ation can be Ω(n) (e.g., when the maximum degree is linear), thus in some
sense RIDe is optimal up to a constant factor for the planar case. However,
this does not preclude the possibility of obtaining a better lower bound and
approximation using electrical flows and this remains an open question. To
strengthen the lower bound and consequently obtain better approximation fac-
tors, we proceed by exploiting the combinatorial structure in certain graphs
as well as demand scenarios.
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3.5 New Lower Bounds
As discussed in Section 3.4, relaxing the spanning tree constraint can
lead to a weak lower bound, mainly because we allow the demand of a single
node v to be delivered via multiple paths from root r to node v. A natural
question at this point is if we can strengthen the flow relaxation by exploit-
ing the tree constraints. We first answer this question by accounting for the
minimum loss each node v creates to get connected to the root, in the ab-
sence of all other nodes, and show how to use this lower bound to achieve
an n-approximation algorithm. Next, we consider cuts in a graph to lower
bound the energy of an optimal tree by considering the demand it separates.
We show that by constructing a laminar family of cuts, one can derive a new
lower bound by accounting for the loss of a spanning tree which is balanced





The major source of hardness in (P2) is the quadratic loss function,
which introduces a cross-term for any two nodes that share an edge on their
path to the root. If the loss was a linear function of the flow, and in the absence
of cross-terms, the problem would decompose into n disjoint problems, which
could be solved via shortest path trees. Note that, however, we can relate the
















where the first inequality is by the non-negativity assumption, and the sec-
ond one is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Now looking at d2i as the
new demand of each node i, our quadratic loss lies between the two linear











. It is easy to show that the shortest-path
tree rooted at node r (with respect to edge resistances, re) solves this opti-
mization problem7, which immediately implies the following result.
Theorem 3.5.1. The shortest-path tree (with respect to resistances) rooted
at r is an n-approximation solution for problem (P2). Moreover, there exist
graph instances for which the cost of a shortest-path tree (or BFS tree) is at
least Ω(n) times the cost of an optimal tree.
Proof. The approximation factor follows from summing up equation (3.8)
across all edges, and the fact that the shortest-path tree simultaneously mini-
mizes both the costs in the left and right-hand side of the resulting inequality.
For the lower bound, consider the graph shown in Figure 3.2. There are n
triplets of nodes in parallel, node r as the root, and a final node labeled
3n+ 1. All nodes (except the root) have demand of di = 1, and all resistances
are equal. On the left, we have the shortest-path tree (BFS tree) whose cost






















Figure 3.2: Lower-bound example on the performance of the shortest-path tree:
(Left) shortest-path tree, versus (Right) optimal spanning tree.
can be calculated as:
APX = n× (12 + 22) + (n+ 1)2 + n× 12 = n2 + 8n+ 1.
On the right, we have the optimal tree which does not change the first 3
triplets, but re-configures the rest as shown. The cost of this tree is
OPT = (n− 3)× (12 + 22 + 32) + 3× (12 + 22) + 42 + 3× 12 = 14n− 8.
Comparing the two costs proves a lower bound of Ω(n) on the performance of
the shortest-path tree algorithm.
3.5.2 Cut-based lower bounds
We now consider special graphs with a particular set of cuts that yield
improved approximation factors. For the rest of this section we assume that all
the edges of the graph have the same resistances, and without loss of generality
we set re = 1 for all e ∈ E.
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Theorem 3.5.2. Consider a graph G = (V,E) with root r ∈ V , and re =
1,∀e ∈ E. Assume that G has a family of cuts S1, S2, ..., S` ⊂ V (with r ∈
Si,∀i) s.t.:
(a) each edge e ∈ E appears in at most M cuts, i.e., |{i : e ∈ δ(Si)}| ≤ M
for all e ∈ E,
(b) the union of the cuts ∪iδ(Si) supports a spanning arborescence8 A rooted
at r such that (directed) edge (u, v) ∈ A only if u ∈ Si, v /∈ Si for all
i ∈ [`] such that e ∈ δ(Si).
Then, the approximation factor of the arborescence A is at most M×maxi |δ(Si)|.
Proof. Let K = maxi |δ(Si)| be the size of the biggest cut. We can use the
second assumption of the theorem statement, to map any edge (u, v) of the
arborescence to a cut Si (if there is more than one cut, we can pick one arbitrar-
ily). In this way, we split the cost of arborescence A among different cuts, while
ensuring that the edges are carrying flows directed out of the cuts. Considering
any of these cuts, we show that the costs of the trees A and OPT restricted
to that cut are within a factor K, i.e.,
∑
e∈δ(Si) EA(e) ≤ K
∑
e∈δ(Si) EOPT (e) for
all i.
Let S be one of the cuts with r ∈ S, and let k = |δ(S)| be the size
of the cut. Let a1, ..., ak be the flow on the edges crossing the cut (calculated
8An r-arborescence is a directed spanning tree such that for any vertex v, there is exactly
one directed path from r to v (see [68] for more details).
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based on tree A), where ai > 0 if the flow is going out of the cut and ai < 0
if it is flowing inwards. With this choice of directions, the arborescence A has
only non-negative ai values. We also know that the total flow going across this





Let b1, ..., bk be the flow of the edges crossing this cut in the optimal
tree, where some of these variables may be zero if the optimal tree is not using
that edge, or even negative if they are being used in the opposite direction.




v/∈S dv, and also the cost of this cut in









v/∈S dv gives a lower bound on the cost even if it is not attainable by

































where in the last inequality we dropped the (non-negative) cross-terms aiaj,
and used the fact that the cut size k ≤ K. If the cuts were disjoint, the
K-approximation would directly extend to the entire objective function as
well, as the cuts would divide the objective into separate additive objectives.
However, we may double count what the optimal tree is paying since the cuts
are not disjoint, but we know that each edge will be counted at most M times.
This gives the approximation ratio of M ×K in total.
We use Theorem 3.5.2 for an n × m grid (where we let the number
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of nodes be N = mn), and consider diagonal cuts as shown in Figure 3.3.
Note that these cuts partition the edges of the grid, and their size is less than
2
√
N . Any spanning tree that has edges only going to the right or the bottom,
satisfies the second requirement of Theorem 3.5.2, and thus has cost at most
2
√
N times the optimal spanning tree.
Corollary 3.5.3. There exists an O(
√
N)-approximation algorithm for min-
imizing the loss on an n ×m grid with N nodes, when all the edges have the






























Figure 3.3: n× n grid with root at the top-left.
Constructing the above described set of cuts for general graphs remains
an open question; planar graphs would be a natural candidate. By the planar
separator theorem [69], we know that any N -node planar graph has a vertex
separator of size O(
√
N) that splits the graph into two (almost) equal parts.
However, it is not clear how to find the desired family of cuts by using the
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planar separator oracle. This is due to the second requirement of the cuts in
Theorem 3.5.2 which fixes a natural direction on any edge once it appears in a
cut. This direction should be respected in future cuts that include this edge;
however, the separator oracle is oblivious to edge directions.
3.6 A 2-Approximation for Uniform Grid via Min-Min
Algorithm
We now propose a constant-factor approximation algorithm for an n×m
uniform grid (n ≤ m) with the root at a corner of the grid (see Figure 3.3), in
which all demands are equal (di = 1 for all i ∈ V \{r}) and all resistances are
equal (re = 1 for all e ∈ E). The key idea of considering this case is to help
us better understand the structure of optimal solutions through combinatorial
techniques, that can be generalized for real-life distribution networks (Figure
3.4). Even though the demands and resistances are uniform in the n×n grid, it
is non-trivial to connect the loads together in a way that avoids big flow values
close to the root. For example, Figure 3.3 demonstrates an example tree on an
n × n grid, that satisfies the properties of both Theorem 3.5.1 and Theorem
3.5.2 solutions, and yet fails to provide a constant-factor approximation. The
horizontal edges in this tree have flows of n, 2n, ..., (n− 1)n, and therefore the
cost of the tree is in the order of
∑n−1
i=1 (i × n)2 = O(n5) (vertical edges have
a total cost of O(n4)). On the other hand, the optimal cost in this grid is
O(n4 log n), as we will show an Ω(n4 log n) lower bound in Lemma 3.6.1 and
prove a constant-factor approximation in the rest of this section. For the sake
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Figure 3.4: Snapshot of an anonymized real distribution network from a utility
company in the US. These networks typically look like sparse subgraphs of grids,
thus motivating our exploration of approximations in Section 3.6 and computational
experiments in Section 3.8.
of brevity, we will present our novel Min-Min algorithm for a square n × n
grid, while the results hold for rectangular grids as well and more general
demands.
Notation: We let n×n be the size of the grid and the total number of nodes
be N = n2. We consider the diagonal cuts as shown in Figure 3.3 and we
name them (u, i), i = 1, ..., n − 1 for the upper triangle, and (`, i) for the
lower triangle. Note that the diagonal cuts cover all the edges and each edge
appears in only one cut. Therefore, we can divide the cost of any spanning tree
(either optimal or approximate tree) into the costs from each cut. Let OPT (u,i)
and Alg(u,i) denote the cost of edges that cross cut (u, i) in the optimal and
approximate solution, respectively. Similarly we define OPT (`,i) and Alg(`,i)
for the lower triangle. Finally, let OPT u =
∑n−1
i=1 OPT
(u,i) and OPT ` =
∑n−1
i=1 OPT
(`,i). Then, we have OPT = OPT u + OPT `. Similarly, we define
Algu and Alg`.
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In Section 3.6.1, we will first use these diagonal cuts to find a lower
bound for the cost of any spanning tree. In Section 3.6.2, we explain our
Min-Min algorithm that will crucially use these diagonal cuts, and give its
performance guarantee in Section 3.6.3.
3.6.1 Lower bounds
Let Su,i and S`,i be the number of nodes below cuts (u, i) and (`, i),
respectively. Then, Su,i = n






Upper triangle cuts: By a quick look at the structure of the grid, we can
observe that there are 2i edges that cross the cut (u, i). These edges are
connected to i nodes on the root side of the cut, and i+ 1 nodes on the other
side. Call these nodes u1, ..., ui on the root side and v1, ..., vi+1 below the cut.
We call an edge (uj, vk) of the tree outgoing, if uj is the parent of vk in the
tree. We claim that the tree can have at most i + 1 outgoing edges over this
cut, although it can have all the 2i edges. This is because if we have more
than i + 1 outgoing edges, then by the pigeonhole principle, a node vk will
have two parents and this creates a loop in the tree.
In addition, all the Su,i nodes below the cut are connected to the root
through (at least) one of these outgoing edges over this cut. This is true
because we can traverse the path from the root to that node, and at some
point we must cross the cut through an outgoing edge. It is possible to have
multiple outgoing edges on that path if we cross the same cut multiple times,
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but all we need is that each node below the cut is counted as a successor for at
least one of the outgoing edges. So the aggregate number of successors for the
outgoing edges of cut (u, i) is at least Su,i, while there are at most i + 1 such
edges. Recall that when the summation of a number of variables is fixed, their
sum of squares is minimized when all of them are equal. Hence, in the most
balanced way any tree (including the optimal tree) has to pay the following
cost over this cut:









By summing the above lower bound over different cuts, we can also get
the following lower bound on the energy of any spanning tree over the entire
upper triangle.
Lemma 3.6.1. The cost of the optimal tree over the upper triangle part of the
grid is lower bounded by: OPT u ≥ Ω(n4 ln(n)).
Proof. To obtain a lower bound for OPT u, we just plug the value of Su,i in


















































Lower triangle cuts: The argument here is exactly the same as in the upper
triangle except that there are i+ 1 nodes on the root side and i nodes on the
other side. Therefore, in the most balanced case when all the outgoing edges
carry the same flow, we have i outgoing edges with flows S`,i/i = (i + 1)/2,
paying the total cost of:










The Min-Min algorithm builds a spanning tree which contains n dis-
joint paths with different lengths over the lower triangle; see the blue paths
in Figure 3.6 (right). Then, in each cut of the upper triangle, exactly one
pair of subtrees merge together. As the name suggests, we merge the two
subtrees with the minimum number of successors in each step, and call it the
merging step. However, this requires those two subtrees to be next to each
other. Therefore, we need to order our disjoint paths in the lower triangle in a
way that allows merging minimum load subtrees in the upper triangle; we call
this the uncrossing step. In the following lemma, we show that the number
of successors of edges on the main diagonal can be any permutation of the
numbers 1, 2, ..., n.
Lemma 3.6.2 (Disjoint paths). We can obtain a disjoint path decomposition
of the lower triangle of the grid (i.e., a set of n paths from the diagonal that are















Figure 3.5: Example of Lemma 3.6.2. In each step we decrease the number of
successors desired by one and put them on the next diagonal (red nodes), except 1
which is already satisfied.
for any ordering of numbers 1, 2, ..., n, specifying the number of successors of
edges on the left diagonal of the grid.
Proof. We give a recursive construction which also proves the existence of such
paths. Let (a1, a2, ..., an) be a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n). Put these numbers
on the main diagonal. Except ai = 1 which is already satisfied, connect the
rest of the nodes to the nodes of the next diagonal, which has n− 1 nodes, in
the same order. Now we have to construct a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n− 1) on
this new diagonal, because the previous numbers should be decreased by one.
We can repeat the process. An example is performed in Figure 3.5.
Note that Lemma 3.6.2 ensures the adjacency of minimum subtrees in
all upper triangle cuts. To get the right permutation, we can start from any
permutation (say 1, 2, ..., n) and do the Min-Min merging as shown in Fig-
ure 3.6 (left). Then we can do the uncrossing from top to bottom as shown
in Figure 3.6 (middle) and this gives the desired permutation on the main
diagonal. Finally, we can construct the lower part of the spanning tree cor-
responding to that permutation using Lemma 3.6.2, and construct the upper
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Figure 3.6: Example of the Min-Min algorithm. Left: Merging the two smallest
numbers in each layer, starting from the 1, 2, ..., n sequence. Middle: Same tree
re-ordered from top to bottom to avoid crossings. Right: The corresponding grid
where the lower triangle is constructed by Lemma 3.6.2, and the numbers in the
upper triangle are merged in each diagonal layer according to the middle tree.
part of the spanning tree by merging minimum size subtrees in each layer.
An example of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3.6 (right). The formal de-
scription of the algorithm for general rectangular grids is also tabulated under
Algorithm 3, in which for the case of a rectangular grid, we use the middle
part of the grid to connect the lower triangle to the upper triangle via parallel
disjoint paths.
3.6.3 Approximation factor for the Min-Min algorithm
Lower triangle: We first show that the cost of Min-Min algorithm is at
most 4/3 of the optimal tree, over the lower triangle.
Lemma 3.6.3. The Min-Min algorithm costs at most 4/3 of the optimal over
the cuts in the lower triangle. In other words,
Alg(`,i) ≤ 4
3
OPT (`,i), i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
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Algorithm 3 Min-Min algorithm
Input: An n×m grid (n ≤ m).
1: Start with sequence (m− n) + 1, (m− n) + 2, ..., (m− n) + n.
2: while there are more than two numbers do
3: Merge the two smallest numbers.
4: Add one to the entire sequence.
5: end while
6: Uncrossing: Backtracking the previous step, find the right permutation
of the starting sequence to put on the diagonal cut (u, n − 1), to ensure
the adjacency of smallest two numbers in all steps.
7: Parallel paths: Use parallel paths of length m− n to connect the nodes
below cut (u, n− 1) to the nodes above cut (`, n− 1).
8: Disjoint paths: Subtract m − n from the sequence of Step 6. Now use
Lemma 3.6.2 on this sequence to form the disjoint paths on the lower
triangle.
9: Merging: Complete the spanning tree by merging the two smallest sub-
trees in every upper triangle cut.
where Alg refers to the output of Min-Min algorithm. Moreover, this implies




Proof. By the construction of Lemma 3.6.2, the edges of the proposed tree







, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Comparing to the lower bound (3.12) for lower triangle cuts:
Alg(`,i)
OPT (`,i)









Since this is true for all cuts, it also holds for the entire lower triangle.
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Upper triangle: To analyze the Min-Min algorithm over the upper triangle,
we first obtain the following relation between the cost of the algorithm over
different cuts.
Lemma 3.6.4. For i = 1, . . . , n− 2, we have










Proof. Let a1, a2, ..., ai+1 be the number of successors for the edges of cut (u, i),
in non-decreasing order (i ≥ 2). We know that∑i+1j=1 aj = Su,i. Since we merge
a1, a2 in the higher level, the edges of cut (u, i−1) will have (a1 +a2 +1), (a3 +
1), ..., (ai+1 + 1) successors. Therefore the cost of cut (u, i− 1) is
Alg(u,i−1) = (a1 + a2 + 1)
2 + (a3 + 1)








aj + 2a1a2 + i = Alg
(u,i) + 2Su,i + 2a1a2 + i.
Since a1 is the smallest number, it is upper-bounded by the average, i.e. a1 ≤
Su,i/(i + 1). Similarly, a2 is the smallest among the rest, therefore a2 ≤
(Su,i − a1)/i ≤ Su,i/i. So the algorithm satisfies:




By recursively applying this upper bound, we get (3.13).
Next, add equation (3.13) across all upper-triangle cuts and use the
lower bound of Lemma 3.6.1 to upper bound the energy of Alg over the upper
triangle:
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Lemma 3.6.5. The output of the Min-Min satisfies: Alg
u
OPTu
≤ 2 +O( 1
logn
).




























Now, for the first term in (3.16) we have:




(n− 1)n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)
6
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OPT (u,j) ≤ 2OPT u,
where the second inequality is due to (3.11). Finally, we can calculate the last




(j − 1)j = 2
3
n3 − 2n2 + 4
3
n.
Replacing these polynomials back into (3.16) we get:











Dividing this by OPT u and using the lower bound of Lemma 3.6.1 completes
the proof.
Overall approximation: Once we have separate approximation guarantees
for OPT ` and OPT u, the worse approximation factor determines the overall
result.
Theorem 3.6.6. For a rectangular n×m (n ≤ m) grid with loads satisfying
di ∈ [dmin, dmax] for all nodes i ∈ V \{r}, the Min-Min algorithm for the net-







, where α = dmax/dmin. In particular, if the loads
are uniform and as n→∞, the Min-Min algorithm gives a 2-approximation.
Proof. For square grids with uniform loads, the approximation result follows
immediately from Lemmas 3.6.3 and 3.6.5. Moreover, for the rectangular grid
with uniform loads, we can apply the Min-Min algorithm on the lower and
upper triangle parts, and use the middle section to connect the two triangles
simply by parallel disjoint paths. Then the analysis would go through exactly
as the square case.
For non-uniform loads, we consider the uniform counterpart of this
instance, which is the same graph with di = dmin for all i ∈ V \{r}. Running
the Min-Min algorithm on this uniform case outputs a tree T whose loss is
at most twice of the optimal tree in the uniform setting (call the optimal tree
T ∗u , and its loss OPTu). Let f and f̃ be the electrical flows on tree T with the
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actual and modified loads, respectively; then we have f̃ ≤ f ≤ αf̃ . This gives
the following inequality regarding energies:







It only remains to argue that OPTu ≤ OPT , where OPT is the loss
of the optimal tree (call it T ∗) in the original instance. This is true because
if we reduce the loads on T ∗ to dmin, we decrease its loss, but on the other
hand, the resulting energy should still be more than OPTu, by the optimality
assumption of OPTu.
Note that α in the above approximation captures the ratio between
the biggest and the smallest loads, and is usually independent of n in practice
(typically, loads do not vary a lot in a realistic scenario). However, for the
sake of completeness, the above approximation ratio can be thought of as
min{2α2, n}, where n comes from the general result of Theorem 3.5.1 in the
case of a big α.
3.7 A Generalization of Min-Min: Layered-Matching
To make our results applicable to general settings, we extend our in-
tuition from the theoretical results and propose a generalization of Min-Min
algorithm. The main idea is to partition the graph into layers and connect each
layer to the upper layer in a balanced way, similar to Min-Min. To partition
the graph into layers, we can use an arbitrary breadth first search tree rooted
at r, which results in layers based on the hop-distance from the root (this is
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like the diagonal cuts on the grid). To connect layers in a balanced manner,
we use the solution of the flow relaxation, and find the best matching that
creates a flow which is close to the relaxed solution in terms of L∞ norm. In
particular, let us assume that we aim to connect nodes in layer Lk to the upper
layer Lk−1. Let f
r be the solution of the flow relaxation, di be the demand of
node i, and xij be the indicator of picking an edge (i, j) ∈ E. Then, finding






xij = 1 ∀ j ∈ Lk
− ε ≤ xijdj − f rijxij ≤ ε ∀ i ∈ Lk−1, j ∈ Lk : (i, j) ∈ E
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i ∈ Lk−1, j ∈ Lk : (i, j) ∈ E
(3.18)
This IP can be solved very fast in practice since it finds a (local) matching
between two layers of nodes (as discussed in the next section). Once we find
the matching between layers k and k−1, we contract each node of Lk−1 with its
successors, while replacing the demand of that node with the total demand of
the corresponding subgraph. By repeating this process in a bottom-up fashion,
all the nodes get connected to the root via a single path, hence we obtain a
valid spanning tree. The full description of the heuristic is in Algorithm 4.
3.8 Simulation Results
As previously discussed, electricity distribution networks resemble spar-
sified grids. Hence, for our computational experiments, we constructed 25 in-
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Algorithm 4 Layered-Matching Heuristic
1: Compute BFS tree rooted at the root r.
2: Let L0, . . . , Lt be the layers formed in the BFS tree, where L0 = {r}.
3: for k = t, t− 1, ..., 1 do
4: Match each node of Lk to exactly one node in Lk−1 by solving (3.18).
5: for j ∈ Lk−1 do
6: Contract subgraph rooted at j into a single node with demand equal
to that of the entire subgraph.
7: end for
8: end for
stances on 25×25 grids where we sample edges for deletion independently with
some probability p ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} and delete that edge only if it does not
disconnect the graph; an example of such sparsified grids is given in Figure 3.7.
Moreover, we consider demands randomly chosen in the interval [0.5, 1.5], re-
sistances randomly chosen in the interval [1, 10] and the root in the corner. To
incorporate the acyclic support constraint, we utilized Martin’s [70] extended
formulation for spanning trees.
Figure 3.7: An abstraction of a real-life distribution network through an instance of
a sparsified 25×25 grid that was used in the computations, where the sparsification
probability is p = 0.2 and the root is in the top left corner.
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We benchmarked9 the performance of depth-first search (DFS) trees,
RIDe, the Layered-Matching (LM) heuristic, the Branch Exchange heuristic
and the convex integer program. The Branch Exchange variant we utilized
starts a new iteration once an improving solution is found, as opposed to look-
ing for the exchange that results in the most improvement. We also considered
a variant that uses binary search on the value of the improvement where we
only do an exchange if it results in an improvement of at least T ; if no such
improvement exists we divide T by two and proceed. We found that the latter
version was significantly slower.
Our computations show that the algorithms proposed in this paper are
orders of magnitude faster than branch exchange (initialized with a random
DFS tree) while having comparable performance. For example, on 25 × 25
grid instances with sparsification probability p = 0.2, the mean time taken by
the LM heuristic is 1.35 seconds, whereas the mean time it takes the Branch
Exchange heuristic to attain the same cost as LM is around 35,000 seconds
(see Table 3.1). We believe that this improvement is significant and will al-
low system operators to minimize losses even on an hourly basis as demand
patterns change.
Moreover we find that Gurobi mostly failed to even find a feasible solu-
tion for sparsified 25× 25 grids instances in a 24-hour time limit. To help the
IP solver, we provide a warm start solution using different algorithms and let
9We implemented all algorithms in Python 3.7, and used Gurobi 9 [71] as a solver for
the MIP.
73
Table 3.1: Comparing the mean optimality gap from best feasible solution found
(×100%) and mean running time (secs) of different algorithms on sparse 25 × 25
grids with varying probability of sparsification (p).
p
DFS RIDe LM Branch Exchange time
Gap Time Gap Time Gap Time to attain gap of LM
0.05 60.80 0.57 8.13 196.82 1.22 2.93 5680.30
0.1 49.69 0.35 6.36 125.89 1.12 1.92 9380.28
0.2 39.43 0.21 5.73 77.07 0.90 1.35 35181.11
the solver run for 24 hours. This outperforms the Branch Exchange heuristic
after running for the same one day time limit (see Figure 3.8). In addition,
running the MIP with the LM output as a warm-start obtains the same per-
formance as initializing Branch Exchange with the LM output (as opposed
to a DFS tree), however the MIP additionally gives provable optimality gaps.
We report the gap in solution quality with respect to the best feasible solution
found after running all algorithms for 24 hours. In particular, we found that
the best feasible solution was always obtained by either running the MIP with
the LM output as a warm-start or Branch Exchange initialized with the LM
output.
Finally, the computations suggest that the approximation factor ob-
tained by RIDe in practice is in fact much better than the worst-case theoret-
ical bounds we showed. Furthermore, the performance of RIDe (as expected)
and LM significantly improve as the graph gets sparser (see Table 3.1), and
their improvement over Branch Exchange becomes more pronounced. This
is very desirable since electricity distribution networks are indeed typically
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Evaluation of Algorithms 
 on 25 × 25 Grids with p = 0.1







































Evaluation of Algorithms 
 on 25 × 25 Grids with p = 0.2
Figure 3.8: Plots comparing performance of branch exchange (initialized with DFS
trees) and the mixed integer program initialized with the layered matching heuristic
solution, on sparse 25 × 25 grids with sparsification probability p = 0.1 (left) and
p = 0.2 (right). The demands and resistances are randomly chosen in [0.5, 1.5] and
[1, 10] respectively. The dotted horizontal line compares the quality of the Layered
Matching heuristic solution and the color margins represent confidence intervals
across the different instances.
sparse in practice.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied the network reconfiguration problem (for
electricity distribution networks) through the lens of approximation algorithms.
We provided approximation algorithms for different scenarios with restrictions
on graph structure, line resistances, and node demands. A large number of
open questions still remain, including the extension of the
√
n-approximation
(or even constant-factor approximation) to planar graphs, analysis for the
iterative deletion of the min-flow edge (introduced by Shirmohammadi and
Hong [32]), and the hardness of the problem for grids or planar graphs.
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Chapter 4
Algorithms with Guarantees for Mobile
Energy Storage Dispatch
This chapter presents the development and implementation of approxi-
mation algorithms to optimally dispatch mobile storage for power grid support.
The two main themes are algorithm development and the storage dispatch con-
cept, with the latter detailing both the utility and electric vehicle (EV) owner
perspectives. The upward trend in EV growth, coupled with the variability of
solar and wind penetration, are increasingly straining the power grid. With
this, we ask, what if we could redirect EV usage to balance rather than further
strain the grid?
In our storage dispatch concept, the utility sets up an agreement offer-
ing time and location varying rewards to a central planner for the dispatch of
storage to utility designated locations of need. The planner then computes an
optimal dispatch of which batteries to utilize where and when to maximize its
collected rewards, based on the varying battery availabilities.
Our contributions are A) the theoretical development for state-of-the-
art dispatch of a varying set of batteries at multiple time, location and price-
varying distribution nodes, and B) a description of our concept with its poten-
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tial real-world impact, theory-to-concept and other implementation considera-
tions. Our theoretical results include a new strong NP-hardness result, as well
as three approximation algorithms with worst-case performance guarantees of
1/3, 1/2 and 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63 and empirical performance between 82%-100%.1
4.1 Introduction
With the global COVID-19 pandemic, the world is looking more and
more into speeding up the progression of transition to Net-Zero emissions [73].
For the first time in history, oil producers have been forced to sign zero emis-
sions agreements, meaning they have to offset their oil production with green
alternatives. Further, it’s largely agreed that oil demand is likely past its
all-time historic high and will only continue to decline going forward. Lead-
ing this decline is the electrification of transportation, which has surged this
year with electric vehicle technology innovations, including Tesla’s million-mile
battery [74], the new electric/hydrogen trucks from Nikola [75] and expand-
ing ride-sharing EV fleets by Tesla’s Robotaxis and Facedrive. Between this
upward trend in EV growth and the variability of renewable penetration in-
creasingly straining the power grid, we ask, what if we could redirect EV usage
to balance rather than further strain the grid?
As an example of a strained grid, consider the image of a real-world
1This chapter is based on the manuscript submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Power




Figure 4.1: Thermal violations on a real distribution feeder.
distribution feeder shown in Figure 4.1. Only twenty hours of thermal viola-
tions over an entire year force a five-mile line upgrade at a cost to the utility
of $400,000. These violations occurred in 2018 and the subsequent required
upgrade was completed by the Texas-based utility in 2019. Had these twenty
hours of violations been mitigated using alternative methods, such as EV bat-
teries, a single battery discharge of say 75 kWh (an average EV battery size)
would have been worth up to $225 to the utility.2
The above situation is typical of utility feeders facing required upgrades,
usually caused by load growth, new EV charging demand and added variabil-
2Amortized over 20 years including interest, this upgrade effectively costs the utility
$30,000 per year. If our mobile storage solution were used for these twenty hours of viola-
tions, rather than the line upgrade, it would have resulted in an opportunity cost of $1,500
for each of these 20 critical hour. The twenty hours of thermal violations averaged 500kWh
per critical hour (approximately 10% over line rating) with a cumulative 10MWh total.
Utilizing several EVs with battery capacities of 75 kWh, discharged during each critical
hour, could have prevented the thermal overload and resulting line upgrade. Thus each EV
discharge of 75 kWh could have been worth up to $225 to the utility during these critical
hours. As an aside, this $225 equates to $3/kWh. Compared to $0.10/kWh, this implies a
cost to the utility that is 30 times higher than their typical customer electricity rate.
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ity from residential solar. This particular utility has around 60 feeders (other
larger utilities may have hundreds of feeders) that have many cost saving
opportunities—thermal, voltage, demand charges and others thus justifying
there is a market for flexible storage. It also demonstrates the need for effi-
cient dispatch algorithms to meet the scale of thousands of potential benefit
nodes in each network, paired with thousands of participating EVs. With
the world heading towards higher energy efficiency and increasing residential
solar and plug-in EVs adding more disturbances to the grid, flexible storage
could provide viable short-term and long-term solutions for many distribution
feeders.
Motivated by the above, we envision our mobile storage solution that
uses EVs to mitigate both critical and non-critical violations. Our proposed
solution can be much more versatile and cost-effective than traditional solu-
tions, which are typically limited to line/equipment upgrades, bulk load shed-
ding and demand response. Specifically, our solution can be effective in mit-
igating thermal, voltage and other violations, reducing transmission demand
peak charges, improving short-term voltage control, and increasing system ef-
ficiency (through reduced losses, preservation of equipment life and improved
three-phase balancing).
In our proposed solution, the utility needs to announce rewards at
different times and locations of need, capturing the above-listed objectives,
and then a central planner calculates a dispatch each day for moving her
available batteries to these points of need.
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Electric Vehicle Charger Placement
Our goal is to find an optimal 
placement of electric vehicle 
chargers in a city to balance 
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Motivation
An increase in the use of Electric 
Vehicles could cause power grid 
overloads and outages in the 
immediate future.
We tested the algorithm on 
different input sizes to make 
sure the algorithm was 
efficient.
Testing and Evaluation
Our solution converts client data and 
potential charging station locations into a 
linear programming problem, solves to 
provide a feasible placement, then visualizes 
on Google Maps. 
Runtime
Our input data, client information and charger 
locations, were transformed into costs based 
on driving distance, charging station 
installation costs, and estimated electric 
vehicle counts.
client cost = (distance * per-mile + time * per-minute) 
dummy cost = (# EV users * opportunity cost)




This graph shows that the 
algorithm runs in polynomial 
time. Our calculations 
confirm that the algorithm is 
O(n2) on average.
We tested for correctness by 
comparing the algorithm’s 
calculated cost minimization 
function with the brute forced 
optimal cost minimization 
value. 
Even though our problem is 
NP-Hard, we found that for 
small test cases, our 
algorithm returns the optimal 
solution. For larger test sets, 
we found that the LP and 
rounded solution have the 
same cost minimization 
value.
The Linear Program is a mathematical 
formulation of our problem, that we derived 
from the existing facility location problem.
Total cost = charging station installation costs + 
client costs
Rounding Algorithm
We use two main algorithms, deterministic 
rounding and randomized rounding to turn 
the LP into a solution. Deterministic rounding 
involves assigning the cheapest client to a 
charging station and randomized rounding 
uses the client assignment values as a 
probability distribution from which to choose 
a client. 
Block Diagram
These visualizations show charging stations (the charger 
icon), clients (circled house icon), and power lines colored 
by amount of load. The “After” image shows that our 





Figure 4.2: Example of eliminating violations via our mobile storage solution.
To illustrate our solution’s potential benefit to the grid, Fig. 4.2-(lef )
shows an example where, in the absence of a mobile storage solution, feeders
A, B and C have: critical thermal or other violations (red), other non-critical
cost-saving opportunities (yellow) and a good operating condition (green),
respectively. The prior day, the utility announces r wards of $40, $20 and $0
for, say, 2 pm today. For calculation purposes, $40 is derived from a 75kWh
battery. (Compare to the $225 EV discharge value in the real-world example
above.) In Fig. 4.2-(right), batteries are discharged and collect the rewards at
points A and B (both at schools) and charged at point C (a grocery store),
a d consequently the violations are eliminated.
In this new age of increasing renewable and EV p netration, utilities
face the real need to b come innovative and our solution can be a valuable and
cost-effective new tool for their toolboxes. Stepping into the near future, we
also see our solution as complementary to Tesla’s 2020 robotaxis launch [76],
with Tesla’s CEO citing fleet re-charging as an open challenge. This chapter’s
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technical contribution is directly relevant by proposing algorithms for optimal
dispatch of charging and discharging of EVs, and our solution could add an-
other dimension to ride-sharing business models, where EVs can be profitably
used in conjunction for both ride-sharing and grid support.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
1. We propose a mobile storage solution designed to: (1) mitigate ther-
mal and voltage violations; (2) reduce transmission and other demand
charges; (3) improve short-term voltage control; and (4) increase system
efficiency through reduced losses, extended equipment life and improved
three-phase balancing. Our solution computes a dispatch each day for
moving available batteries to points of need, as determined by the utility
via a set of rewards reflecting its above objectives.
2. To optimize the battery discharge dispatch, we set up a mathematical
model and prove that the problem is strongly NP-hard.
3. Despite the computational hardness of the general setting, we obtain
the optimal solution for several special cases of the problem, when (i) we
have access to super-fast chargers, (ii) we have a single battery, (iii) the
number of batteries is constant, or (iv) all batteries have constant charg-
ing time and the same availability. We use these special cases as insights
to the theoretical nature of the problem and building blocks for solving
the general setting next.
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4. We then propose three approximation algorithms, greedy, greedy+,
and randomized rounding, and we prove that they provide (worst-
case) performance guarantees of 1/3, 1/2, and 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63, respec-
tively. We also consider a fourth algorithm called boosted random-
ized rounding.
5. We test the empirical performance of the four algorithms, and show that
they perform much better than their worst-case theoretical guarantees,
as they achieve at least 82% of the optimal reward in all test cases.
Somewhat surprisingly, the best empirical performer is greedy+ with
greater than 95% performance, even though randomized rounding
has the best theoretical guarantee.
4.2 Related Work
Energy storage systems are now an inevitable part of the electricity grid,
due to the penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources. Even though
stationary storage systems have been extensively studied in the literature [77–
80], there is much less work on mobile storage systems [81], especially on
mobile storage dispatch, namely where and when these mobile storage units
should be charged and discharged. Behind-the-meter battery storage has also
been considered for eliminating congestion and voltage violations [82–84].
Most research on mobile storage systems focuses on electric vehicle use,
which can provide various services to the grid. EV charging and discharging
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has previously been studied in the context of power loss minimization [85, 86],
social welfare maximization [87], frequency regulation [88], voltage regulation
[85, 89], peak shaving [90–92], valley filling [93], and supporting renewable
energy sources [90, 94]. We refer the reader to a recent survey by Amjad
et al. [95] on various optimization approaches and objectives employed for EV
charging.
Related to our mobile storage concept, He et al. [96] and Hutson et al.
[97] consider charging and discharging of EVs together with EV availabilities.
In contrast to our work, neither of these two papers considers different prices
at different nodes. The mobility of EVs is utilized by Timpner and Wolf [98],
but in a very different scenario, as they only consider the movements within
a parking lot so as to share a limited number of charging ports in a single
location.
Another related result is that of Abdeltawab and Mohamed [99], in
which the authors aim to maximize the profit of distribution network operators
by optimizing the day-ahead schedule of a (single) storage truck. Our work
differs in that we consider many storage devices across the network versus
only one. Also, in contrast to this chapter, they do not provide any optimality
guarantee as they utilize the heuristic approach of particle swarm optimization
to find a profitable dispatch. Furthermore, as we show in this chapter, it is the
multiplicity of storage units that makes the problem computationally hard.
Recently, Krishna et al. [100] proposed an EV charging ecosystem which
is in a sense the reverse of our concept. In their model, the central planner is
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responsible for matching the EV users to private garage chargers (which are
typically under-utilized) in order to alleviate the demand-supply mismatch in
public charging. An online competitive algorithm for a similar problem was
proposed by Sun et al. [101], where the charging network operator aims to
maximize its expected total revenue via offering different charging station and
prices to EV owners.
Finally, the dispatch of mobile power sources, such as truck-mounted
emergency generators, has been studied in the case of natural disasters [102–
104]. However, the objective is very different in those extreme situations as
the goal is to restore the power of critical loads as soon as possible, in other
words to minimize the interruption cost.
From an algorithmic perspective, most existing work is either based
on mixed-integer programs [82, 84, 105], which cannot be solved efficiently for
large instances, or heuristics without optimality guarantees. These heuristics
include genetic algorithms [106], particle swarm optimization [97, 107, 108],
and ant colony optimization [109]. In contrast, we exploit techniques from
theoretical computer science to provide novel hardness results and approxi-
mation algorithms, which are scalable algorithms with rigorous performance
guarantees.
We see our work belonging to the small but growing body of research
bridging theoretical computer science and power systems, specifically utiliz-
ing tools from approximation algorithms to provide rigorous guarantees for
the mobile storage dispatch problem. Other related work employing rigorous
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theoretical analysis for power systems problems includes: repair and restora-
tion in power systems [110, 111], complexity of switching in transmission and
distribution systems [5, 48, 50], energy plan selection in retail markets [112],
energy sharing of prosumers [113, 114], energy-efficient truck transportation
[115], and voltage control in smart grids [116].
4.3 Mobile storage solution: Concept
Utility solution set-up: Our mobile storage solution is to connect batteries
to the distribution network at locations and times of utility planning and op-
erational need. Our solution takes as input distribution nodal costs provided
by the utility, which may incorporate: (1) thermal, voltage and other viola-
tions; (2) transmission demand charges and seasonal peak-related charges3;
(3) short-term voltage control; and (4) system efficiency (losses, equipment
life and three-phase balancing).
Most utilities already do periodic historical power flow analysis every
1-4 years to determine where both critical violations and non-critical stress
points are occurring on each of the feeders in their distribution network. For
example, Fig. 4.3(a-b) show critical thermal and voltage violations on a single
feeder, and Fig. 4.3(c-d) show non-critical three-phase imbalances and power
losses, indicating potential cost-saving opportunities.
Based on its historical power flow analysis and its planning and opera-
3Demand charges are typically based on a few select hours each year and can account
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Figure 4.3: Left to right: (a) thermal violations, (b) voltage violations, (c) 3-phase
imbalances, and (d) power losses on a real distribution feeder. Red denotes violation
of limits, orange/yellow, feeder is nearing its limit and green, the feeder is within
normal operating bands.
tional goals, the utility decides where to place a limited number of connections,
e.g., 10-20 on each feeder. Note the timestamps in Fig. 4.3, which illustrate
that violations and stress points can occur within short time spans (e.g., one
day) on a single feeder. Additionally, due to utilities having tens to hundreds
of feeders depending on their size, there may be many opportunities for grid
support and cost savings.
Concept implementation: The utility would start announcing time-varying
rewards at the installed connection ports, serving as incentives for the mobile
storage operator as explained below. The rewards are announced the day
before and remain fixed the following day when they are being collected.4
Next, the mobile storage operator computes an optimal schedule for
collecting the best subset of rewards, given available batteries. Note, the
4According to our industry contact [117], “day ahead forecasts of grid load are very
accurate”, so setting effective rewards a day ahead should be viable.
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operator can be set up as a profit-maximizing third-party or as an in-house
service as part of the utility. Henceforth, we refer to the operator as the
‘central planner’ or ‘planner’.
The third participant in our solution is the group of mobile batteries,
which come from: (i) EV owners with variable schedules responding to in-
centives and (ii) EV fleets owned/managed by ride-sharing companies, cities,
autonomous fleets, etc. We envision EV owners would respond to incentives
similarly to Uber/Lyft or food delivery drivers. Also, Tesla’s Robotaxis and
Facedrive are examples of new and expanding EV fleets, which would provide
service for monetary compensation and could additionally benefit from the
efficient charging and discharge management our solution provides.
To make it worthwhile for all three parties (utility, planner and EVs)
to participate, each party needs to be reasonable and share the overall benefit.
To this end, the utility’s offered rewards need to be less than its expected
cost in the absence of the mobile storage solution, say between 25% to 75%.
For instance, the utility’s expected cost and corresponding nodal cost in the
real-world thermal violation from the introduction are $400,000 and $225 re-
spectively. At a 40% reward to nodal cost ratio, the utility could announce a
reward of $90 at the designated location(s) and time(s). Additionally, there
are voltage violations, demand charges, losses and three-phase balancing that
offer cost-saving opportunities to the utility in the $10 to $60 range ($0.13 to
$0.80/kWh).
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Benefits and incentives: There are inherent benefits to using EVs over
other forms of storage, mainly in that EVs have no upfront or re-occurring
expenditures (in the purchase and maintenance of the batteries). So if EVs
can be utilized effectively, they would provide notable operating cost savings
to both the utility and planner.
For EV owners to participate, they need to have appropriate incentives,
which in the simplest case could be free and convenient parking, offering them
savings of $20-$40 in inner cities over just a few hours. Additionally, owners
that do not need parking could still provide their vehicle to the planner for
monetary compensation. The EV owners’ benefit would thus be: A) free and
convenient valet parking, B) a portion of the collected rewards, when offered,
and C) the moral benefit of lowering their carbon footprint while also helping
lower their and their neighbors’ electric bills.
For fleets (e.g., Tesla Robotaxis, city vehicle fleets, rental car fleets,
etc.) the incentives would be fixed monetary amounts per discharge and/or
profit-sharing. An additional benefit to both EV owners and fleets is that
their vehicle will always be returned fully charged, which would be especially
attractive to EV owners without in-home charging ability.
The aforementioned benefits should far outweigh the wear and tear on
the EV battery, which we estimate at about $5-$7 per charging cycle.5 This
estimate is expected to decrease to less than $2 per cycle with Tesla’s launch
5This estimate is based on a 5-year replacement of a $4,000-$5,000 battery system, with
150 discharging cycles per year.
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of the million-mile battery [74]. Furthermore, the planner could allow EV
owners to set a limit of one or two discharges per day. This trade-off is similar
to Uber/Lyft or food delivery drivers who accept the wear and tear on their
cars for more immediate monetary compensation.
In summary, we have made a case that there are opportunities for mit-
igation of different grid violations along with cost-saving opportunities each
day, and when considering each utility’s tens or hundreds of feeders, optimal
dispatch becomes imperative for a mobile storage solution to be both effective
and efficient. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that a mobile storage so-
lution can incentivize EVs to participate at a price point that works for both
the utility and the planner. A key advantage of our solution is that it does
not lead to a zero-sum outcome and everyone benefits while making the whole
system more efficient and increasing social welfare.
This brings us to the next sections in this chapter, which detail our
algorithms (including hardness and performance guarantees) needed to allow
for a scalable and effective mobile storage solution.
4.4 Problem Definition and Hardness
In this section we propose our mathematical model for the optimal
dispatch of batteries by the mobile storage operator, and study the hardness
of the proposed optimization problem.
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4.4.1 Problem definition
We consider a set B = {1, 2, ...,m} of batteries and a discrete time
horizon T = [T ] = {1, 2, . . . , T}. Every battery i ∈ B is associated with a set
Ti ⊆ T of availabilities, i.e. times where it can be charged and discharged,
and a charging time Ci ∈ N, that is, the time the battery needs to recharge
before being ready to be discharged again (or returned to the owner). We say
that a battery i ∈ B is available at time t, when t ∈ Ti. We also consider a set
P = {1, 2, . . . , n} of ports that can be used for discharging a battery. At any
time t ∈ T , any available battery i ∈ B can be discharged at some port j ∈ P ,
and obtain reward pj,t ∈ R. Notice that the reward depends on both the port
and time of discharging. Moreover, a reward can be negative, modeling in
this way the fact that the benefit to the utility at a specific port/time can
be smaller than the cost of recharging. Without loss of generality, we assume
recharging is free by redefining each reward to be the difference between the
discharging reward and the charging cost. We furthermore assume that the
time to move a battery between discharging and charging locations is relatively
small and included in the charging time.
Our objective is to find a feasible assignment of batteries to ports/times
that maximizes the total collected reward. In any feasible assignment, the
following conditions must hold:
(a) Every port can be assigned to at most one battery i ∈ B at every time
t ∈ T such that t ∈ Ti.
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(b) Every battery i ∈ B can be associated with at most one port j ∈ P at
any time t ∈ Ti.
(c) If a battery i ∈ B has been discharged at some port at time t, the same
battery cannot be discharged again during the time interval [t+1, t+Ci],
as it needs Ci time units to get recharged.


















xi,j,t′ ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ B, t ∈ Ti (4.3)
xi,j,t ≡ 0, ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ P , t /∈ Ti (4.4)
xi,j,t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ P , t ∈ Ti. (4.5)
In the above IP, xi,j,t denotes the decision variable of discharging battery i ∈ B
at port j ∈ P and at time t ∈ T . Constraint (4.2) ensures that every port can
be used to discharge at most one battery at any time period, while constraint
(4.3) is the validity constraint for the recharging restriction, capturing that
for every battery i, discharging cannot occur sooner than Ci units of time
following the previous discharge.
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4.4.2 Hardness result
We now prove that for a non-constant number of batteries and for
arbitrary availability intervals, problem (4.1) is strongly NP-hard. In terms
of algorithmic design, this statement implies that, unless P = NP, not only
is there no polynomial-time algorithm for solving the problem optimally, but
also there is no algorithm that can produce an assignment of reward greater
than 1− ε of the optimal, in time polynomial in the input size and in 1/ε.
Theorem 4.4.1. Problem (4.1) is strongly NP-hard, even for the (easier)
special case where all the charging times are identical, and all rewards are 0-1.
Proof. We use a reduction from the well-known strongly NP-hard 3D-matching
problem [118]. In the 3D-matching problem, we are given as input three sets
of nodes A,B,C such that |A| = |B| = |C| and a set E of hyperedges of the
form ei = (αi, βi, γi), with nodes αi ∈ A, βi ∈ B, γi ∈ C. The problem is
to decide whether there exists a matching S ⊆ E such that every node of
A ∪B ∪ C is covered by some edge and no two edges of S share a node.
Given an instance I = (A,B,C,E) of the 3D-matching problem,
we begin by considering a time horizon T such that T = [4M + k], where
k = |A| = |B| = |C| and M is a large number such that M ≥ 2k. For
example, an instance of the 3D-matching problem with k = 2 is shown
in Fig. 4.4 (right) with its corresponding time horizon on the left (assuming
M = 4). We create one port j0 which has reward pj0,t = 1 for times t ∈
[1, k] ∪ [2M + 1, 2M + k] ∪ [4M + 1, 4M + k], and pj0,t = 0 for the rest of
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Figure 4.4: Example with k = 2, M = 4, and C = 6, created from the 3D-matching
instance on the right. Availabilities of each battery (which encode the hyperedge of
the same color) are checked in the upper table, and the circled ones represent the
optimal solution which collects all the rewards in the lower table.
the times. Moreover, we create |E| − k additional identical ports, each having
reward pj,t = 1 for t ∈ {M, 3M}, and pj,t = 0, elsewhere. For the example of
Fig. 4.4, since there are |E| = 3 hyperedges, we have only one additional port
j1.
Regarding the batteries, we create a battery i for each hyperedge ei =
(αi, βi, γi) and set Ti = {αi, 2M + βi, 4M + γi} ∪ {M, 3M}, where we assume
that αi, βi, γi ∈ [k] are the indices of the nodes in an arbitrary (fixed) ordering.
For example, in Fig. 4.4 the blue hyperedge has e = (α = 2, β = 2, γ = 1),
assuming that the ordering in A,B,C is from top to bottom. Therefore the
corresponding battery has availability T = {2, 10, 17} ∪ {4, 12}. Finally, for
all batteries, we set the same charging time C = M + k.
By the above construction, given a polynomial-time exact algorithm
for our problem, one could decide on the feasibility of 3D-matching. More
specifically, our algorithm is able to collect all the non-zero rewards if and only
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if the answer of the 3D-matching instance is yes. Indeed, the batteries that
correspond to the k hyperedges of the matching can collect every reward of
the j0 port, while the remaining |E| − k batteries can collect all the rewards
in the j 6= j0 ports. For the other direction, it can be shown that in the case
where the answer of the 3d-matching problem is no, there is no feasible
assignment of batteries that can collect all the rewards.
4.5 Special Tractable Cases
Given that the problem at hand is strongly NP-hard, we turn to design-
ing approximation algorithms. To develop a better understanding and insight
into the applicable algorithmic methods, we first analyze several special cases
that can be solved optimally in polynomial time.
4.5.1 Zero charging time
When we have access to super-fast chargers, which can charge the bat-
tery in a time much smaller than our time unit, we can assume that Ci = 0.
This implies that any battery can be discharged during any time of its availabil-
ity, and we show that our problem can be reduced to the maximum bipartite
matching problem [119], which can be solved in polynomial time. To see this,
consider a set of vertices L such that (i, t) ∈ L for any battery i ∈ B, t ∈ Ti, and
a set of vertices R such that (j, t) ∈ R for all ports j ∈ P and times t ∈ T . We
also define the set of edges E = {{(i, t), (j, t′)},∀(i, t) ∈ L,∀(j, t) ∈ R, t′ = t}
and associate every edge that is adjacent to some node (j, t) ∈ R with weight
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equal to the reward pj,t. Given this construction, the optimal dispatch corre-
sponds to a maximum bipartite matching in the aforementioned graph, which
can be solved optimally in polynomial time [119].
4.5.2 Single battery
The problem accepts a polynomial time LP-based algorithm for the
case where there is a single battery. In this case, we can assume without loss
of generality that there is only a single discharging port, otherwise we consider
the port of highest reward at every time. We should note that, although the
case of a single battery is contained in the case of constant number of batteries
(studied next), the following result provides useful intuition on the geometry
and polyhedral aspects of the problem. Let xt ∈ {0, 1} be the decision variable
denoting the discharging of the single battery at time t. Consider the following








xt′ ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T1 (4.7)
xt ≡ 0, ∀t /∈ T1 (4.8)
xt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T . (4.9)
We can show the following important property about the feasibility region of
the above LP.
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Theorem 4.5.1. All the vertices of the polytope (4.7-4.9) are integral.
Proof. Constraint (4.7) can be written in matrix form as Ax ≤ b, in which A
is a {0, 1}-matrix, and b is an all-ones vector. Note that every row of A has
1+C1 consecutive ones, and the remaining entries are all zeros. Such a matrix
is called an interval matrix, a special class of totally unimodular matrices (see,
e.g. [120] Chapter 19). An alternative characterization of a totally unimodular
matrix A is that for all integral vectors a, b, c, d, the polyhedron {x|c ≤ x ≤
d, a ≤ Ax ≤ b} has only integral vertices. Since our constraints (4.7-4.9) are
of such form, we conclude that all the extreme points of the LP (4.6-4.9) are
integral.
Since the LP relaxation provides an upper bound, the above integrality
result implies that the solution of the LP is the optimal solution to the original
problem.
4.5.3 Constant number of batteries
The third class of instances that can be solved in polynomial time
corresponds to the case where the number of batteries (m) is small enough
and can be considered constant. For this case, we can solve the problem
using dynamic programming. More specifically, we construct a matrix OPT ∈
Nm+1 with entries OPT (t, r1, r2, . . . , rm), where every variable ri denotes the
remaining time for a battery i ∈ B until it is able to be discharged again. Notice
that the total size of this matrix is O(TCmmax), where Cmax = maxi∈B Ci =
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Θ(T ). In general, for the computation of every element OPT (t, r1, r2, . . . , rm)
of the matrix, we want to find which combination of available batteries we can
discharge such that the reward collected plus the future optimal reward given
this discharging is maximized. Notice that trying all possible combinations
of batteries to discharge is polynomial, given the assumption of constant m.
By the above analysis, it suffices to recursively compute all the entries of
the OPT (t, r1, r2, . . . , rm) matrix, starting from the end of the time where
the solution is trivial. After the computation of the whole matrix, the value
OPT (t = 1, r1 = 0, r2 = 0, . . . , rm = 0) would be the answer to our problem.
Notice that we can easily extend the above algorithm to keep track of our best
choices at each time and return, in addition to the optimal reward, the optimal
dispatch. In the following, we give an example of a recursive computation for
the case of a single port:
OPT (t, r1, r2, . . . , rm) = max
i∈B∪{∅}
{
OPT (t + 1, Ci, ri − 1) + pj,t · 1[t ∈ Ti]
}
,
whereOPT (t+1, Ci, ri−1) is the short form forOPT (t+1, r1, r2, . . . , rm) where
we replace ri with Ci and all other indices (denoted by i) are decremented by
one (if they are positive).
4.5.4 Homogeneous batteries
A similar dynamic programming approach works for the case where
all batteries have the same availability period and the charging time, say C,
is constant and identical. In that case, we only care about the number of
available batteries and not their identity. We construct a matrix OPT ∈ NC+2,
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with elements OPT (t, r0, r1, r2, . . . , rC), where t ∈ T is the time and r` is the
number of batteries that will be available in ` time periods. Since ` is upper
bounded by the charging time C, the size of the matrix is O(TmC+1), and the
elements can again be computed in a recursive manner as follows:








pj,t · 1[t ∈ T1]
}
,
where k is the number of batteries that we dispatch at time t, upper bounded
by the number of available batteries r0. For the optimal k, the set S corre-
sponds to the top k ports with the highest rewards, which will be assigned
to those k batteries. In the next time step t + 1, these batteries will appear
as the last argument, since they now need C time steps to get charged. In
addition, all other arguments will be shifted one to the left, as the batteries
which needed ` time periods (for charging) at time t will need another ` − 1
time periods at time t+ 1.
4.6 Approximation Algorithms
Building on the above, in this section we present three approximation




We first present a greedy algorithm. Even though this algorithm has
a weaker approximation guarantee than the algorithm in the following sec-
98
Algorithm 5 greedy
1: Initialize: F = {(i, j, t)|i ∈ B, j ∈ P , t ∈ Ti}.
2: while F 6= ∅ do
3: Choose the feasible assignment of maximum reward:
(i, j, t)← argmax{pj,t|(i, j, t) ∈ F}.
4: Assign battery i to the port/time (j, t) and collect the reward pj,t.
5: Remove from the feasible set F all the assignments that are no longer
feasible.
6: end while
tion, it has the advantage that it applies to a more general setting where
the rewards can depend not only on the time and location, but also on the
battery. That is, for any choice of battery i ∈ B, port j ∈ P and time
t ∈ Ti the collected reward can be battery specific, denoted by pi,j,t. We define
F = {(i, j, t), i ∈ B, j ∈ P , t ∈ Ti} to be the set of all feasible assignments, that
is, all the possible triplets of batteries to port/time pairs that can be realized
individually, assuming an empty schedule. Consider the following algorithm:
at each iteration, we greedily pick the highest available reward, assign it to
an available battery i (or the battery that gives that reward in the case of
battery-dependent rewards), and remove all the triplets that are no longer
feasible. This includes any other battery that wants to discharge at the same
port and time, as well as the triplets that wish to discharge the same battery
within a period of Ci time intervals. The formal algorithm is tabulated under
Algorithm 5. We can prove the following performance guarantee for it:
Theorem 4.6.1. The greedy algorithm produces in polynomial time a so-
lution of total reward P ≥ 1
3
OPT , where OPT is the reward of an optimal
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dispatch.
Proof. The polynomial running time of the algorithm can be readily justified.
The algorithm sorts O(mnT ) initial assignments and then constantly updates
the ordered list in linear time, by removing any infeasible assignments. The
total number of iterations is at most O(min (nT,mT )). On the approximation
ratio of the algorithm, it suffices to make the following crucial observation: Let
A and O be the set of assignments in the greedy and the optimal solution,
respectively. For any assignment (i, j, t) ∈ A, we distinguish between two
cases: whether (a) it is in the optimal solution (i, j, t) ∈ O or (b) it is
not, i.e., (i, j, t) /∈ O. Notice that in the second case, the assignment (i, j, t)
excludes at most three assignments that are made in the optimal solution:
(b1) ∃i′ 6= i s.t. (i′, j, t) ∈ O, that is, another battery is assigned to the same
port/time pair in the optimal solution, (b2) there exist t′ 6= t and j′ such that
(i, j′, t′) ∈ O and t′ ∈ [t − Ci, t + Ci], i,e, the optimal solution contains an
assignment of the same battery i that is incompatible with (i, j, t) given the
charging time restriction. It is not hard to verify that for any battery i, there
can be at most two assignments in any interval [t−Ci, t+Ci]. Therefore, given
that greedy always chooses the assignment of highest reward, the reward of
every (i, j, t) ∈ A, pj,t, is greater than 13 times the sum of rewards of the
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Intuitively, a major issue with the algorithm greedy, is that the choice
of every step is oblivious to the charging time restrictions for every battery.
For example, consider an instance of a single battery and three possible as-
signments pi,j1,t=1, pi,j1,t=Ci , pi,j1,t=2Ci , such that pi,j1,t=1 = pi,j1,t=2Ci = 1 and
pi,j1,t=Ci = 1 + ε, for a really small ε > 0. In that case, the greedy would
choose the assignment of reward 1 + ε, making the other two incompatible,
while the optimal choice is of reward 2, and consists of choosing the first and
the third feasible assignment. In order to improve this situation, we propose
the following alteration of the above greedy algorithm, namely, greedy+.
The new algorithm starts from an arbitrary battery and finds the optimal al-
location for this battery individually, which, as we have described, can be done
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Algorithm 6 greedy+
1: Initialize: F = {(i, j, t)|i ∈ B, j ∈ P , t ∈ Ti}.
2: while F 6= ∅ do
3: Choose a new arbitrary battery i ∈ B and compute the most profitable
combination of assignments, given the set of feasible assignments F .
4: Assign the computed pairs of port/time to battery i and collect the
corresponding rewards pj,t.
5: Remove from the feasible set F all the assignments that are no longer
feasible.
6: end while
in polynomial time. After this, the corresponding rewards are collected and
the incompatible assignments are removed. The procedure is repeated over all
batteries. The algorithm is formally stated in Algorithm 6.
We are now able to prove a stronger approximation guarantee for greedy+:
Theorem 4.6.2. The greedy+ algorithm produces an assignment of total
reward P ≥ 1
2
OPT , where OPT is the reward of an optimal assignment.
Proof. We denote by Si,i′ the set of pairs (j, t), j ∈ J, t ∈ T such that the opti-
mal schedule assigns them to i ∈ B while the schedule produced by greedy+
assigns them to i′ ∈ B. Let also OPTi and Pi be the total reward collected
by battery i ∈ B in the optimal and in our schedule, respectively. Clearly,
OPT =
∑
i∈B OPTi and P =
∑
i∈B Pi, where P is the total reward collected
by our algorithm. At the first iteration, our algorithm chooses a battery, say
i1 ∈ B, and computes in polynomial time the optimal assignments of this
battery alone, in which case Pi1 ≥ OPTi1 . For the rest of the batteries, our







every iteration the chosen battery collects reward at least equal to the reward
it collects in the optimal schedule minus the rewards that are already collected



































that is the total amount of reward “stolen” by other batteries cannot be more
than the total collected reward. After plugging this in the above inequality,
the theorem follows.
4.6.3 A (1− 1
e
)-approximation randomized algorithm
In this section, we present an LP-based randomized algorithm with
a performance guarantee of 1 − 1
e
≈ 0.63, which is better than the previous
greedy algorithms. We consider the linear programming relaxation of IP (4.1),
which we create by allowing the decision variables to take any non-negative
value, i.e. xi,j,t ≥ 0.
This LP formulation gives an upper bound to the optimal solution
of our problem. Since the LP solution in not necessarily integral (or even
half-integral), we adapt a randomized rounding algorithm, proposed in [121]
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for an interval scheduling problem with application to bandwidth trading.
Although our problem is not the same, nor a special case of the bandwidth
trading problem [121], they both turn out to be special cases of a more general
problem, which can be solved by the same randomized rounding algorithm.
The formal description of the algorithm adapted to our problem is given under
Algorithm 7.
Since the LP solution can be fractional, a single battery could be as-
signed fractionally to conflicting discharging ports. But constraint (4.3) guar-
antees that at each time, the total assignment is at most one, allowing us to
fit the assignments in a strip of height one as shown in Fig. 4.5. The rounding
phase consists of sampling a random horizontal line in this figure, and picking
the assignments that it intersects.
y = 1
y = 0












Figure 4.5: Example of Randomized Rounding for a fixed battery i of Ci = 4. We
have the following non-zero assignments: xi,1,1 = 0.50, xi,2,2 = 0.25, xi,3,6 = 0.75,
xi,4,8 = 0.25, xi,5,11 = 0.25 and xi,6,11 = 0.25. Notice that the rectangle of port
3 has been fragmented into two slices of height 0.25 and 0.50. For the random
horizontal lines y = y1 to y = y4, the corresponding feasible assignments are {3},
{2, 4}, {1, 3, 6} and {1, 3, 5}, respectively.
The following theorem provides a performance guarantee for the ran-
domized rounding algorithm. We refer the reader to [121] for a complete proof.
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Algorithm 7 Randomized Rounding
1: Solve the LP relaxation and let {xi,j,t} be the (fractional) solution.
2: for every battery i ∈ B do
3: Let Ai = {(j, t)|j ∈ P , t ∈ Ti, xi,j,t > 0}
4: Consider an empty 2-dimensional area: [1, T + 1]× [0, 1] ⊆ R2 defined
by the x-axis and the y-axis.
5: for (j, t) ∈ Ai in non-decreasing order of t ∈ T do
6: Create a rectangular area of y-coordinates within [0, xi,j,t] and of
x-coordinates within [t, t + Ci + 1), if the corresponding area is
empty.
7: If this area is not empty, split the rectangle into smaller stripes
of fixed width [t, t + Ci + 1), and fit these slices anywhere in the
y-axis. (Notice that the rectangles can be fragmented only in the
y-axis, but no fragmentation is allowed in the x-axis.)
8: end for
9: Sample a horizontal line from y = 0 to y = 1 uniformly at random.
10: Assign battery i ∈ B to all the ports and times which are crossed by
the line.
11: end for
12: If more than one battery has been assigned in the same (j, t), j ∈ P , t ∈ T ,
arbitrarily keep one.
Theorem 4.6.3 ([121]). The Randomized Rounding algorithm creates a
feasible assignment of expected reward E[P ] ≥ (1− 1
e
)OPT , where OPT is the
reward of an optimal assignment.
4.7 Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the empirical efficiency of our proposed
algorithms. In the absence of actual data on our problem and in order to prove
the robustness of our algorithms, we choose test cases of variable charging
times, variable availability intervals and rewards that are generated by random
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initial starting values and then randomly change at each time step within a
defined range.
4.7.1 Simulation setting
We compare the performance of our algorithms with the optimal re-
ward opt (which we obtain by solving the IP) or with an upper bound on
opt (which we obtain by solving the LP relaxation). We also consider the
boosted version of the randomized algorithm, called boosted randomized
rounding, in which we repeat the randomized algorithm 10 times and return,
among the solutions we found, the one with the highest reward, amplifying in
this way the probability of choosing a profitable dispatch.
In terms of test cases, we consider a time horizon of T = 24 hours
and various combinations of the number of batteries and ports. The charging
time of each battery is a number between 1 and 6 hours (to capture different
capacities, charging rates, etc.) chosen uniformly at random (u.a.r.). On the
availability of each battery, we distinguish between two types: those with a
single continuous interval of length 1 to 24 chosen u.a.r., and those with three
(smaller) intervals of length 1 to 8 chosen u.a.r.. We also define the starting
time of each interval to be a number between 1 and 24 chosen u.a.r.. On the
choice of rewards, we initially choose for each port j ∈ P a value pj,1 between
0 and 100 u.a.r. to denote the average reward, differentiating in this way the
ports in terms of their location. Then, we model a smooth change in the
reward on a specific port as follows: for t > 1 we draw pj,t from [`j,t, uj,t] u.a.r.
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with `j,t = max{0.7·pj,t−1, pj,1−25, 0} and uj,t = min{1.3·pj,t−1, pj,1 +25, 100}.
That is, the reward of any (hour, port) pair is always within 70% to 130% of
the reward of the previous hour, and always within a band of ±25 from the
initial reward.
Given our observation that the number of batteries is without loss of
generality greater that the number of ports, we simulate for different values of
the following two parameters: (a) The number n of discharging ports and (b)
the ratio of the number of batteries m, over the number of ports n, denoted
by R = m
n
. The values we consider are n ∈ {1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200} and R ∈
{1, 2, 4, 8}. Finally, for every choice of n and R, we perform 10 independent
experiments and return, for each algorithm, the average of the empirical ratios
found.
We solve the integer and linear programs using Gurobi Optimizer 8.0,
while we use Python 2.7 for scripting.
4.7.2 Presentation and analysis of the results
The empirical approximation ratios resulting from our simulations are
presented in Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.6. We denote by star (*) the cases where the
approximation ratio is computed with respect to the optimal reward.
In Fig. 4.6 we have plotted the performance ratio of the proposed algo-
rithms separately for each value of R, the ratio between the number of batteries
and ports as a function of n. There is no clear relation between the number
of ports (n) on the x-axis and the performance ratio on the y-axis (remem-
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Table 4.1: Empirical approximation ratios.
R=1 1* 5* 10* 20* 50* 100* 200*
G 0.888 0.898 0.876 0.872 0.873 0.871 0.880
G+ 1.000 0.988 0.991 0.993 0.997 0.998 0.999
RR 1.000 0.993 0.963 0.937 0.913 0.908 0.826
BRR 1.000 0.993 0.966 0.960 0.959 0.939 0.919
R=2 1* 5* 10* 20* 50* 100* 200*
G 0.931 0.878 0.889 0.889 0.883 0.889 0.883
G+ 0.990 0.981 0.987 0.994 0.995 0.997 0.998
RR 1.000 0.971 0.968 0.894 0.875 0.866 0.883
BRR 1.000 0.982 0.977 0.942 0.922 0.935 0.928
R=4 1* 5* 10* 20* 50* 100* 200*
G 0.872 0.900 0.909 0.905 0.909 0.909 0.911
G+ 0.955 0.977 0.983 0.990 0.993 0.996 0.997
RR 0.964 0.983 0.898 0.876 0.847 0.861 0.870
BRR 0.967 0.983 0.948 0.938 0.926 0.929 0.933
R=8 1* 5* 10* 20* 50* 100 200
G 0.923 0.951 0.961 0.961 0.964 0.965 0.966
G+ 0.973 0.986 0.989 0.992 0.995 0.997 0.998
RR 0.988 0.967 0.962 0.979 0.981 0.978 0.981
BRR 0.988 0.982 0.977 0.986 0.989 0.992 0.993
ber that our worst-case performance ratios are constant). Hence, these plots
should be merely seen as a comparison between the proposed algorithms in
different independent scenarios. Based on our simulation results, we can make
the following observations:
• The actual performance of our algorithms in every case is significantly
better than the theoretically proven worst-case guarantees, i.e. 82% −
100% of the optimal. Moreover, the overall performance of all algorithms


























Figure 4.6: Performance ratio of the proposed algorithms for different values of
R = m/n (number of batteries over the number of ports).
performance of our algorithms gets closer to the optimal solution as we
employ more batteries.
• The greedy algorithm (which has the worst approximation ratio of 1
3
),
has the worst empirical performance among our algorithms, specifically
87%− 96% of the optimal.
• For the case of R = 1 and n = 1, we observe that the randomized
rounding always produces the optimal result, a fact that is justified by
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the integrality of the LP relaxation in this case (see Theorem 4.5.1).
• The greedy+ algorithm achieves the best performance, producing em-
pirical ratios of at least 95% of the optimal. After that, boosted ran-
domized rounding has the next highest empirical performance of at
least 92%, which is significantly better than the simple randomized
rounding.
4.8 Conclusion
The distribution grid is ripe for cost-effective storage solutions. We
have proposed one such solution that utilizes EVs to provide grid support. As
shown in the real-world example in the introduction, our mobile storage so-
lution can be more flexible and cost-effective than traditional line/equipment
upgrades or stationary storage, while still accomplishing a variety of planning
and operation objectives. Our solution can add a new layer to a utility’s
toolkit, while also helping the transition of distribution planning and opera-
tions into a future of notably higher EV and renewable grid penetration.
Our contributions here have included a description of our mobile storage
concept and the supporting theory to bring it to fruition, including a new com-
putational hardness result and efficient algorithms with provable guarantees
that also perform very well empirically. Future work could include extend-
ing the current theoretical model to online EV arrivals as well as mechanism
design for aligning utility rewards with EV participation incentives. Another




Energy Procurement with Abandonment
In this chapter, we study a dynamic model of procurement auctions
which is motivated by the procurement of energy. In the energy sector, if
the system operator does not assign sufficient generation to a specific energy
generator, the generator may go out of business due to their overhead costs
and financial constraints. Motivated by this, we study a dynamic model of
procurement auction in which the agents (sellers) will abandon the auction if
their utility does not satisfy their private target, in any given round. We call
this “abandonment” and analyze its consequences on the overall cost to the
mechanism designer (buyer), as it reduces competition in future rounds of the
auction and drives up the price. We show that in order to maintain competition
and minimize the overall cost, the system operator may choose to assign the
generation to less efficient sources in order to make sure that they survive and
make it to the future rounds. We focus on threshold mechanisms as a simple
way to achieve ex-post incentive compatibility, akin to reserves in revenue-
maximizing forward auctions. We then consider the optimization problem
of finding the optimal thresholds. We show that even though our objective
function does not have the optimal substructure property in general, if the
underlying distributions satisfy some regularity properties, the global optimal
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solution lies within a region where the optimal thresholds are monotone and
can be calculated with a greedy approach, or even more simply in a parallel
fashion.1
5.1 Introduction
The wide applicability of auctions in real life, from the simple tra-
ditional sealed-bid and ascending/descending price auctions, to the modern
sponsored search and eBay auctions, to government-run auctions for spectrum
and carbon emissions, has inspired the development of a rich theory of auctions
and mechanism design. The more prevalent auction design focuses on the so
called ‘regular’ auctions, where the bidders are buyers wishing to buy an item
from the mechanism designer (seller), who tries to maximize her revenue (see,
e.g. [123]). Less prevalent are ‘reverse’ or ‘procurement’ auctions where the
bidders are sellers and the mechanism designer is a buyer wanting to minimize
cost.
A principal example of procurement auctions is public procurement—
the process by which governments purchase goods, services and construction—
which comprises a significant fraction, 10-20%, of a country’s GDP [124]. Some
of the more complex procurement auctions include the above mentioned spec-
trum and carbon emissions auctions, as well as the procurement of energy, a
1This chapter is based on the manuscript submitted to the ACM Conference on Eco-
nomics and Computation [122]. The author of this dissertation made the primary technical
contribution to this work.
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key motivation of this chapter.
A notable feature of the above examples that makes the corresponding
auction processes especially complex in reality is their repeated nature with
interdependencies among the different rounds. Thus, while the large majority
of literature on auction and mechanism design focuses on static mechanisms
that optimize the designer goals with a single round in mind, there has been a
recent rise in the study of dynamic mechanism design which attempts to model
and analyze mechanisms across time [125]. In the context of procurement,
different strands of literature investigate different types of interdependencies,
such as caused by a capacity constraint [126, 127], a switching cost from one
service provider to another [128, 129], a backlog cost in dynamic inventory
control models [130, 131], learning through experience [132, 133] and piecewise
procurement where the subprojects of a large project have to be procured in
a predetermined order [134, 135].
Yet very simple and basic models for dynamic procurement remain
unexplored that provide fertile ground for theory exploration and progress.
We propose one such model which takes the most basic reverse auction of
multiple sellers needing to provide a unit of divisible good or service over
repeated rounds, with the condition that a seller must make at a minimum
her overhead cost in order to remain present in future rounds of the auction.
This provides a coupling or interdependency of the different rounds of the
auction that precludes existing mechanisms from applying and calls for new
tools in mechanism design.
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Our motivation for this model comes from the process for energy pro-
curement called “economic dispatch”: Electricity generation is currently man-
aged by Independent System Operators (ISO) in a myopic way (day by day).
Each generator submits a supply curve, namely one or more bids of how much
it is able to generate at what unit cost, for the following day. The ISO then al-
locates generation, based on demand (and subject to any system constraints),
so as to minimize the total generation cost. Economic dispatch is thus effec-
tively a generalized version of the standard procurement auction.
In a lot of US markets, wind is typically the least expensive form of gen-
eration, thus it is favored by the current selection mechanism over conventional
generation (nuclear, coal and gas). Coal, as the least competitive conventional
generation, is gradually being driven out of business due to underuse. Wind
though has higher variability and uncertainty, and requires increased use of
expensive back-up generation, while conventionals are reliable and do not need
to be backed up. Ultimately, this is pushing the system to the two extremes
of cheap, variable renewables and expensive, back-up generation. As a result,
this short-term cost-minimization approach yields a higher long-term cost and
compromises system reliability [136].
In reality, a less competitive generator whose economic viability is
threatened might be “saved” by the ISO if it is considered critical to sys-
tem reliability, by entering a side contract with the ISO that guarantees it
sufficient allocation and payment to help it remain viable. Such contracts
are currently done behind closed doors in an ad hoc way, including the ISO’s
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decision which generators it considers critical.
To improve system efficiency and transparency, our model here makes a
first step toward providing a framework for systematic allocation and payments
that minimize cost over multiple periods. Specifically, two issues stand out
from the brief background on energy procurement above. One issue is the
need to capture the agents’ overhead costs necessary to stay in business as
a model feature to make transparent the process of identifying and saving a
needed agent. We call the phenomenon of permanently leaving the auction
due to not having met the overhead cost in a given round as “abandonment”.
The second, related issue, is the tension of cost vs competition, or short- vs
long-term outlook, namely that being optimal in the current round might be
suboptimal from a long-term perspective. That is because cost minimization
in a given round might result in fewer agent allocations and thus reduced
competition in future rounds, which would lead to a higher cost in the future.
We discuss these two issues in more detail in the context of our model and
results below.
Modeling choices and assumptions. Our goal is to frame the above real-
life situation as a simplified auction theory model that abstracts away many
engineering components, which are important but not central to the core mech-
anism design challenges. What are the minimal features our model can be
stripped down to, that make it as simple as possible yet expressive of the
two above-mentioned issues of (i) abandonment and (ii) tradeoff of cost and
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competition?
We focus on a two-round model with n symmetric agents (sellers), each
of whom can meet the entire demand of 1 unit of divisible good/service per
round, and each of whom submits a bid for her overhead cost, namely the
amount she needs to make this round to “be saved” and remain in the next
round of the auction. The overhead costs are private values, independent and
identically distributed according to some known distribution F , across agents
and across rounds.
To keep the model tractable, we assume that a per unit production
cost that sellers incur for providing the good/service is known and constant
(which turns out mathematically equivalent to it being zero). For example,
in the energy application above, the cost of producing energy can easily be
estimated by the technology; however, the overhead costs of generators (such
as financing, labor costs, maintenance, etc.) are private information.
In a given round, the auctioneer or mechanism designer collects the
bids and decides on the allocations and payments which in turn determine
which agents are going to be saved for the following round. We will argue
later that in the last day, the mechanism designer is going to allocate the
entire demand to a single agent (since there is no need to maintain the com-
petition anymore). Further, to more succinctly capture the challenges that
abandonment and competition issues present, we assume that even in that
final round, the mechanism should satisfy the overhead cost constraint of that
single agent: this is also equivalent to removing this assumption and having
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one extra round, namely a 3-round auction setting.
Abandonment. In both forward and reverse auctions, when the auction is
repeated over several iterations, it has been noted that the agents may leave
the platform. The typical assumptions used in the literature are of dynamic
arrival and departure that are exogenous and are not related to the outcome of
the auction [137, 138]. In a regular auction the agent may prefer to change her
auction platform if she is not receiving enough utility. Similarly, in a reverse
or procurement auction, for example in the energy sector, if the generators do
not meet their overhead costs they are forced to close down.
Two natural modeling choices for the utility function of an agent stand
out to capture the abandonment: the utility for being allocated zero or, more
generally, for being paid less than one’s overhead cost could be modeled as
zero or as negative infinity (or, equivalently, a large negative constant). The
first choice may appear more natural on the surface but it fails to align the
incentives with the phenomenon of abandonment—specifically, it fails to rep-
resent the negative repercussions of a bankruptcy in reality, which is what we
are trying to model with agents abandoning the auction. Indeed, if an agent
ever goes out of business, the agent should not be incentivized to stay in the
auction. Furthermore, zero utility for zero allocation is inaccurate in the en-
ergy context where power plants continue having overhead expenses (such as
employee salaries and power plant maintenance) even if they are not allocated
and not producing in a given time period, so effectively a zero or even insuffi-
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cient positive allocation implies losses which are what ultimately drives plants
to retire. We thus opt for the negative infinity model, which also emphasizes
the “finality” of an agent’s participation in the auction if she is not allocated
or has not met her overhead cost in a given round.
We remark that with this modeling choice, the utility function will not
satisfy individual rationality, in that participating in the auction may have
lower expected utility than not participating. Again, this is consistent with
the energy and likely a number of other applications where starting a business
such as building and operating a power plant entails risk and is not guaranteed
to break even. We note the relation of our utility function choice to regular
auctions where a buyer has a budget and receives a utility of negative infinity
for exceeding it (e.g., [139, 140]). Indeed, we can view the overhead cost that
needs to be met each period as a reverse budget where, once the budget is
exceeded, or in our case the reverse budget is not met, the agent is forced to
abandon the auction.
Competition vs cost. In a one-shot environment it is well understood that
competition lowers cost and a monopoly increases it. Over multiple rounds,
however, the connection of cost and competition is not as straightforward.
Already in our two-round setting, we can see that in order to meet the demand
while satisfying agent overhead costs, it is cheapest for the mechanism designer
to pick the single lowest bid agent and allocate the entire demand to her—
cheapest in the first round, that is. This can be implemented by running a
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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism where we ask each agent for their
overhead cost. However, due to abandonment, this would result in all but
one agent abandoning the auction after the first round, and would lead to a
monopoly situation in the second round whereby the designer needs to pay the
maximum amount to the single remaining agent—paying the upper bound of
the agent’s bid distribution. Allocating to multiple agents in the first round
would be a lot more costly in that round: is the higher cost worth the savings
that would result from increased competition in round 2? Indeed this question
highlights one of the central design challenges for our mechanism discussed
in Section 5.4, and a key technical challenge in the resulting multi-variate
optimization problem discussed in Section 5.5.
Bid-sensitive vs bid-oblivious mechanisms. Following the above discus-
sion, there is a trade-off between the cost we incur on day 1, and the com-
petition that exists on day 2. We thus expect that there is an optimal point
in the trade-off between cost and competition. In other words, there should
be an optimal number of agents that balances the cost required to save those
agents today, and the expected cost we incur tomorrow given the competition
among this surviving number of agents. Let k denote this optimal number of
agents. Now we can generalize the well known truthful second-price auction as
follows: after the agents submit their bids, the mechanism assigns the demand
to the cheapest k agents and all those k agents receive a payment equal to the
(k + 1)st bid. Note that the higher k is, the higher the cost would be in the
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current round, but there will be more competition (hence less cost) in future
round(s), and vice versa. Hence, the optimal k can be calculated based on the
distribution F and the number of rounds left.
In fact, we can do even better than the mechanism described above,
which we call a “bid-oblivious” mechanism. In a bid-oblivious mechanism, we
commit to save k agents, independently of their bids. Instead, we could let
the bids determine the number of agents to be saved, via using appropriate
thresholds. This is similar to revenue maximization in regular auctions, in
which by setting a reserve price we ensure that the item is not sold at a cheap
price. If all the bids happen to be less than the reserve price, the item would not
be sold. Similarly here, we can save k agents only if the lowest k bids are below
a certain threshold. In this way, we can dynamically decide on the number of
agents to be saved, and achieve a lower cost. We call this a “bid-sensitive”
mechanism, as the bids affect the number of agents that get allocated the
service. We provide an example on how bid-sensitive mechanisms can achieve
a lower cost compared to bid-oblivious mechanisms in Appendix C.1.
Preview of our results and challenges. Our goal is to design the optimal
bid-sensitive mechanisms, i.e., to find the optimal thresholds for allocating the
service to various number of agents at every round. Specifically, for our two-
round auction, it suffices to set the corresponding thresholds for round one, as
the final round has a trivial optimal mechanism. We denote by ti the threshold
for saving i agents in round one. Our main result is to show that the global
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optimization for the thresholds t2, t3, ... can be done in a greedy fashion, even
though the objective function does not have the optimal substructure property
that usually leads to optimality of greedy approach (see Theorem 5.5.5).
To illustrate this, consider and example with three agents in which
the overhead costs are drawn from a uniform [0, 1] distribution. Let C(t2, t3)
be the expected cost of both rounds, given that we set thresholds t2, t3 for
round one (meaning that we save all three agents if all 3 bids are below t3;
otherwise, we save two agents if 2 bids are below t2, and if not we save only
one agent. Note that t1 = 1, since we always have to save at least one agent).
We show in Example 2 in Section 5.4 that the optimal thresholds in this







). Yet this simple example reveals a few interesting
observations:
1. If the underlying distribution satisfies certain properties, the optimal
thresholds are monotone, i.e., t∗2 ≥ t∗3 ≥ t∗4 ≥ · · · (see Lemma 5.5.1 and
Theorem 5.5.5 in Section 5.5). Even though this may seem intuitive,
we show in Example 5 in Appendix C.4 that this is not always true for
general distributions.
2. We can find the optimal threshold mechanism with a greedy algorithm,
meaning that we can start by optimizing over t2 (while setting t3, t4, ...
to any arbitrary values). This gives the optimal value for t2. Then, using
the optimal value of t2, we can optimize over t3. However, if we do this













Figure 5.1: Derivative of the cost with respect to the threshold for saving 3 agents
(∂C/∂t3). The blue area represents the points (t2, t3) for which this derivative is
negative, and the red/yellow area represents the positive region. The green star







values. We illustrate this in Figure 5.1, where the black curve shows the
optimal value of t3 for any arbitrary value of t2. Specifically, the figure
shows that if we first optimize over t3, we get a value different than 1/12
(unless t2 is set to a high enough value).
3. Figure 5.1 also shows the derivative of the objective function with respect
to t3 for any pair (t2, t3). We show in Section 5.5 that as long as t2 > t3
(under the diagonal line), the sign of the derivative is independent of the








we see that the optimal t3 is even higher that t2. The situation becomes
even more chaotic if we add one more agent, as the optimal value of t3
122
could depend on t4 as well. However, we show that fortunately none of
these complicating behaviors happen, once we set the earlier thresholds
to their optimal values. More precisely, once we are optimizing over ti
after setting earlier thresholds to their optimal values, the resulting value
we get for ti would be smaller than all previous values, and it will not
depend on the remaining thresholds.
4. Another point worth noting from this example is that the optimal values
of t2 and t3 would remain the same if we added one or more agents
to the initial pool of participants. This is not specific to the uniform
distribution, as we prove it more generally in Lemma 5.5.1. We discuss
the similarity of this independence to regular auctions next.
Similarities to Myersonian approach. Our main result is the charac-
terization of optimal thresholds for our procurement auction setting and an
algorithm to efficiently compute them. One important corollary of our analysis
is that the optimal threshold mechanism is independent of the initial number
of agents participating in the auction. More precisely, it turns out that the
optimal threshold for saving k agents is the value where the marginal contri-
bution to the cost of the current day (virtual cost w.r.t. F ) is equal to the
savings of having the k-th agent present in the future rounds. Note that the
virtual cost function (x + F (x)
f(x)
) is solely determined by the underlying distri-
bution function F . Also, the marginal gain of having the k-th agent in the
future round(s) does not depend on the pool of agents we start with. This is
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very similar to Myerson’s result for revenue maximization in regular auctions:
for n symmetric buyers, the optimal auction is a second-price auction with a
reserve price. The reserve price is obtained by setting the virtual valuation
(defined as v − 1−F (v)
f(v)
) to zero, and is again independent of the number of
agents (n). This similarity is surprising, since in procurement auctions we
have to always meet the demand and we cannot use price as a tool to trade off
utility across different types. However, using thresholds for saving a different
number of agents, we are able to trade off utility across different types and
different rounds.
Another similarity is in how we achieve optimality. In revenue max-
imization, the reserve price is equivalent to supply reduction, meaning that
depending on the bids, the seller has the right to not sell the item. Note that
this means that the optimal auction is not efficient, as the seller will some-
times withhold the object even though the highest bidder has a strictly positive
value. For our cost minimization problem, we achieve optimality via what is
effectively a demand increase. The efficient outcome for each stage is to assign
the service to the agent with the lowest overhead cost since every agent can
satisfy the demand. However, the mechanism may allocate the production of
the service to multiple agents in the hope of decreasing the future costs.2
2Our solution keeps the total production the same, splits the allocation of the service
equally and increases the payment rate accordingly. This is equivalent to increasing the
total demand without inflating the payment rate. See Section 5.3 for more details.
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Summary of results. The results in this chapter can be summarized as
follows:
(a) We model a two-round dynamic procurement auction with abandonment,
where the agents leave the auction if they do not meet their overhead
costs in a given round. We focus on threshold mechanisms, as they
are widely used in practice, and show that they are ex-post incentive
compatible for our dynamic auction model. The thresholds are similar
to setting reserves for revenue maximization in regular auctions.
(b) Next, we study the optimization problem for finding the optimal set of
thresholds. We show that if the distribution F for overhead costs is
regular (as defined later), the optimal thresholds are independent of the
number of agents participating in the auction. In other words, we do
not need to know the number of agents to determine the optimal set of
thresholds.
(c) We prove that if the underlying distribution F satisfies certain proper-
ties, the optimal thresholds will be monotone, meaning that the optimal
threshold for saving i agents is lower than the optimal threshold for sav-
ing j agents for any i > j. Moreover, we show that this monotonicity
helps divide the optimization problem into n separate problems, which




Single-parameter mechanism design has been extensively studied in the-
oretical computer science over the last decade and lead to several interesting
results in the intersection of approximation and mechanism design (e.g. [141]
and references therein). Over the last few years there has been an increased
interest in dynamic mechanism design and specifically, revenue maximization
in repeated auctions [142, 143]. The challenge in this line of work has been
that depending on the assumptions about when the agents obtain their infor-
mation, these models become multi-dimensional, leading to a notoriously hard
problem in mechanism design (see [144] for a survey).
For example, Ashlagi et al. [142] study incentive compatible mecha-
nisms for revenue maximization. In contrast to prior economic literature they
require that the mechanism is strongly individually rational, namely the utility
of each agent should be non-negative at any stage of the game. One interpre-
tation of strong individual rationality in the context of a dynamic auction is
that agents would abandon the service if they ever receive negative utility. Our
model of abandonment in a procurement auction setting can be thought of as
a relaxation of individual rationality, where each agent expects to achieve a
specific level of utility and if she does not meet her target then she abandons
the platform.
Different models of dynamic procurement auctions have been studied in
the past. The common aspect between these different models is an intertem-
poral dependency, either on the procurer/buyer side or the suppliers/bidders,
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that ties the outcomes of the individual auctions. Examples of such depen-
dencies include:
Capacity constraint: When the bidders are capacity-constrained, their costs
increase if they win the current auction (due to higher future capacity utiliza-
tion). Therefore, capacity-constrained firms face an intertemporal trade-off in
sequential auctions: higher profits in the current period lead to lower profits
in future periods. This model has been studied over both a finite [126] and an
infinite horizon [127].
Switching cost: When a procurer buys goods from competing suppliers re-
peatedly over time, she may incur an additional switching cost each time she
switches from one supplier to another. These costs arise because the buyer
must acquire skill at using a new supplier’s product, and affect the competi-
tion between the incumbent supplier and his rivals [128, 129].
Backlog/holding cost: In dynamic inventory control models, the procurer
becomes a retailer who has to repeatedly run a procurement auction among
a number of potential suppliers before observing the actual demand. At the
end of each period, any unsatisfied demand will be backlogged with a backlog
cost and any unsold inventory will be carried over to the next period with a
holding cost [130, 131].
Learning through experience: In many industries learning by doing or
learning through production experience enables suppliers to provide better
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service at lower costs. Lewis and Yildirim [132] consider such model in which
the cost of each supplier at each round consists of a (public) intrinsic cost of
production, which decreases every time that producer supplies the procurer,
and a (private) transitory cost drawn according to a prior distribution. They
study how buyer optimally manages dynamic competition among rival suppli-
ers to exploit learning economies.
Piecewise procurement: Sometimes sequential procurement auctions be-
long to a large-scale project whose subprojects have to be procured in a
predetermined order. The project yields its full value once it is completed.
The question is then how the procurer optimally designs a procurement auc-
tion for each subproject, especially when she cannot write long-term contracts
[134, 135].
In comparison to these previous models, we introduce the notion of
abandonment to the procurement auction, meaning that the suppliers may
leave the auction if their received payments do not cover their internal costs.
Under this model, it is no longer true that repeating a single-round-optimal
auction will lead to assigning the demand to the best set of agents at the best
price [136]. To the best of our knowledge, this fundamental model has not
been studied in the literature.
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5.3 Preliminaries
There are 2 periods and a set of agents N , where |N | = n. Each period
the mechanism designer wants to allocate a unit of production to a subset
of agents. In period j = 1, 2, each agent i is characterized by her overhead
cost M ji and her production cost c
j
i . We assume that the overhead costs are
private and independently identically distributed according to a distribution
F (independent across both agents and rounds). We will assume that F is a
continuous distribution supported on [0, 1].
Let xji be the production percentage allocated to agent i in round j and






2 , · · · ,M jn) =
{
xji (p
j − cji ) xji (pj − cji ) ≥M ji ,
−∞, xji (pj − cji ) < M ji .
(5.1)
Agent i seeks to maximize her aggregate utility u1i + u
2
i from both
rounds. The utility function is capturing the fact that if an agent does not
meet her overhead cost M ji in round j, she goes out of business and loses
everything she gained today. In addition we assume that if an agent receives
−∞ utility she will abandon the auction.
We further focus on the case where the individual production costs cji
are known to the designer and homogeneous across the agents. For simplicity
all our results will assume cji = 0 for all i and j but, as we show in Section 5.6,
this can be generalized if they are the same for all agents in a particular round
129
but not necessarily 0, and can vary across rounds. Hence, without loss of





2 , · · · ,M jn) =
{
xji · pj xji · pj ≥M ji ,
−∞, xji · pj < M ji .
(5.2)
The mechanism designer does not know the overhead costs, M ji , which are all
identically and independently distributed according to a distribution F , i.e.,
M ji ∼ F independent across rounds j = 1, 2 and across agents i = 1, . . . , n.
Mechanism. Each agent reports her current overhead cost M ji to the de-
signer during round j and the designer decides on the allocation xji (M
j
1 , · · · ,M jn)
for all i ∈ N and the anonymous payment rate pj(M j1 , · · · ,M jn). We seek to
design a mechanism that minimizes the expected total cost of the outcome
EMji ∼F
[
p1(M11 , . . . ,M
1
n) + p









i · p1 ≥M1i and M̂2i =∞ otherwise.
Truthfulness. There are several generalizations of truthfulness once we de-
part from the standard single-shot environment. Ex-post incentive compati-
bility requires that agents want to report truthfully their overhead costs if this
maximizes their aggregate utility even if they have access to the realization of
their overhead costs in advance. For example, in our setting with two rounds,
agent i should not have an incentive to report a different value than M1i in
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round 1 despite knowing the value M2i . Periodic ex-post incentive compatibil-
ity relaxes this condition to agents having access to the history of the game
and having only distributional assumptions for their future overhead costs.
Nevertheless, the simple class of threshold mechanisms that we analyze in this
paper satisfies the stronger notion of ex-post incentive compatibility. Each
round j is characterized by a choice of n different thresholds (tj1, t
j
2, . . . , t
j
n),
where tji represents the maximum amount that the mechanism is willing to
pay to save the i-th agent in round j. This is more precisely described in the
following definition.
Definition 5.3.1. A single threshold mechanism using thresholds t1, . . . , tn ∈
[0, 1] is defined as follows: Assume M1 < M2 < · · · < Mn and let us define the
predicate Tk(M1, . . . ,Mn) = 1 if and only if Mk ≤ tk, in other words the kth
smallest value is less than the kth threshold.3 Let k be the highest index such
that Tk = 1. Then the mechanism allocation is:
xi =
{
1/k if i ≤ k
0 otherwise
(5.3)
and the payment to agent i is xi · p, where p is the total mechanism pay-
ment (also the per unit cost of providing the demand) defined as p = k ·
min{tk,Mk+1}. In other words, the cheapest k agents equally provide the
service, while each receiving a payment of min{tk,Mk+1}.
3In the case of ties we need to slightly adjust the description of the mechanism. For the
sake of clarity we present the more general version of the mechanism in Appendix C.2 and
prove that it is truthful. Since we assume continuous distributions, we can assume no ties
for optimizing our objective, without loss of generality.
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The mechanism uses the thresholds to determine the number of agents
it wishes to allocate the service to. Note that allocating the service to more
than one agent is inefficient. Allocating to multiple agents and respecting their
overhead costs means that for every agent such that xi > 0 it must be that
the agent payment is at least her overhead cost, xi · p ≥Mi.
Proposition 5.3.1. Any threshold mechanism is truthful4 in the corresponding
single-shot game and each agent that has non-zero allocation has non-negative
utility.
Proof. If an agent i is not allocated the service, she receives utility of −∞.
Bidding a lower overhead cost may result in her being allocated some part of
the demand. There are two scenarios in which this may happen: (1) If there
exists some k such that Tk is the highest true predicate both before and after
agent i lowered her bid. In this case, it must be that her lower bid is less than
or equal to Mk < Mi. This results in a payment equal to Mk, which makes
her utility −∞ again. (2) If Tk is not the highest true predicate after agent i
lowers her bid. Assume that the new highest predicate satisfied is Tw for some
w > k. Since Tw was not true before, it must be that the threshold tw is now
the critical value, therefore each agent receives a payment equal to tw. But




If agent i is allocated the service, notice that her payment is indepen-
dent of her actual overhead cost. Reporting a lower overhead cost does not
change her allocation nor payment. Similarly, if she reports a higher amount,
she will receive the same payment, as long as she is still being allocated the
service. If her increase makes her not being allocated, then her utility be-
comes −∞. In neither case is deviating from reporting the true overhead cost
profitable.
We now define a threshold mechanism for a two-round game.
Definition 5.3.2. A threshold mechanism for a two round game is character-
ized by two sets of thresholds t1 = (t11, . . . , t
1
n) and t
2 = (t21, . . . , t
2
n). For any
round j, we allocate the demand to at least i agents, if there are i bids below
tji .
While technically the threshold mechanism defined in the second round
could depend on the number of surviving agents, the optimal mechanism in
the last round is oblivious to this fact; it will always allocate the service to
a single agent and offer her a payment equal to the second lowest bid or the
top of the distributional support if only one agent has survived. Since the
mechanism is only feasible if it always allocates the entire demand, we need
to have that tj1 = 1 (the upper bound of the support of F ) and therefore we
will be omitting t1 from now on.
Proposition 5.3.2. A threshold mechanism for a dynamic game is ex-post
incentive compatible.
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Proof. It is easy to see that for j = 2 (the last round), truthfulness of the
threshold mechanism in the single-shot version implies that reporting the truth
in the last round is optimal for each agent. For j = 1, we have to argue that
deviating from the truth does not increase the aggregate utility for the agent.
Since the mechanism is independent of the outcome of round 1, the only way
that the reported overhead cost in round 1 affects the second round is if the
agent is not allocated in the first round, hence has to abandon the auction.
Instead, the agent could misreport a smaller overhead cost in order to ensure
some allocation in round 1 so as to be considered in round 2. But in this case
the aggregate utility of this agent remains −∞, hence she cannot benefit from
the deviation.
As mentioned earlier, our objective in designing a threshold mechanism
is to minimize the total payment of our allocation. In other words, we seek
a mechanism (x, p) with thresholds (t1, t2) such that it minimizes the total
payment. The optimal mechanism for the second round is independent of
what happens during the first round and there is no reason to allocate the
production of the service to more than one agent.
Proposition 5.3.3. The optimal threshold mechanism for the second round
of a two-round auction is always equal to t22 = t
2
3 = · · · = t2n = 0.
Proof. Setting t22 > 0 means that with some probability two agents will be
allocated the service resulting in a payment more than the second lowest bid.
Note that allocating the service to the second lowest agent does not result
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in any benefit in the future (since this is the last round). On the contrary,
setting all thresholds for round two to 0 ensures that we allocate the service to
the agent with the lowest bid, and the payment would be equal to the second
lowest bid. Similarly, setting any t2i to a non-zero value is a sub-optimal choice.
Therefore, the optimal mechanism in round 2 is to set all thresholds t2i to zero
for i ≥ 2. (As always we have t21 = 1.)
Note that when the threshold mechanism allocates to an agent, it en-
sures that the payment she receive is at least her reported overhead cost so she
will not abandon the auction. This is not necessarily needed for the second
round according to the definition of our objective. If we allow the mechanism
to allocate to an agent and not respect her overhead cost, then we could simply
add an additional round. In that case, any feasible mechanism must ensure
that one agent survives to the third round; therefore, the payments should sat-
isfy her overhead cost in the second round as well. Thus our analysis exactly
captures this case when we only focus on the first two rounds.
The main result of our paper is to characterize the first round optimal
threshold mechanism for dynamic procurement. It is important to note the
connection of our problem to revenue maximization where effectively we use
a similar analysis in terms of virtual costs. An alternative way to interpret
our mechanism is that it implements a form of supply increase to reduce the
aggregate cost of the mechanism. Our results hold for natural assumptions on
the distribution of the overhead cost defined below.
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Definition 5.3.3 (Regularity [145]). We say that a probability distribution f
(with cumulative distribution function F ) supported on [0, 1] is regular if its
virtual cost function defined as x+ F (x)
f(x)
is monotone increasing.
Definition 5.3.4 (Order statistics [146]). Let X1, ..., Xn be a random sample
of size n (independent) from a distribution F and X1:n ≤ X2:n ≤ ... ≤ Xn:n be
the order statistics obtained by arranging Xi’s in non-decreasing order. We
denote by µr:n the expectation of the r
th order statistic, i.e.:
µr:n = E[Xr:n]
Definition 5.3.5 (Diminishing returns of order statistics). We say that the
rth order statistic of a distribution F has the diminishing returns property if
µr:n−1 − µr:n ≥ µr:n − µr:n+1, ∀n > r.
Our main theorem is stated below. A surprising property we find is
that the mechanism does not need to know the initial number of agents that
participate in any round of the auction.
Theorem 5.3.4. If distribution F satisfies the regularity condition (Defini-
tion 5.3.3), and its second order statistic has the diminishing returns property
(Definition 5.3.5), then the optimal threshold mechanism can be found in poly-
nomial time.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.4
we define the canonical threshold mechanism and provide a few examples.
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In Section 5.5 we present our main theorem proving the optimality of the
canonical threshold mechanism. In Section 5.6 we discuss generalizations of the
model where our results still hold. Finally, in Section 5.7 we discuss significant
departures from our setting via breaking various types of homogeneity and
symmetry and propose future directions.
5.4 Mechanism
Our objective in designing a threshold mechanism is to minimize the
payment of our allocation. We will use Cn(t2, ..., tn) to denote the aggregate
cost of two rounds given a specific set of thresholds (t2, . . . , tn) for the first
round, where n is the number of agents in round 1.
Example 1 (2 agents, 2 rounds). To develop intuition for the general problem,
we first start with a simple example. Suppose we have 2 agents in round 1.
We want to answer the following questions: “When is it beneficial to keep
both agents alive for the second round? Is there a more efficient way than
committing to save a particular number of agents a-priori?”
Since we have only two agents and one is always picked, we only need
one threshold denoted by t ∈ [0, 1] to determine whether or not picking the
second agent is beneficial. If both bids are below t, we pick both agents and
pay them t each; otherwise, we pick the cheaper agent and the payment would
be equal to the higher bid. To find the optimal t, we have to calculate the
expected cost as a function of t. We assume the overhead costs are drawn
according to a uniform distribution supported on [0, 1], i.e., M1,M2 ∼ U [0, 1].
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Table 5.1: Different scenarios of the bids of two agents (Example 1) with respect to
the threshold t. Here green represents which agents survive to the next round, and
red represents the payment to each of those green agents.
# Case Probability Expected Cost Picture







M1 ≤ t < M2
or












Three different cases can happen regarding the bids (in round one) as shown
in Table 5.1.
For example, in the first case when both bids are below t, we decide to
keep both agents alive; therefore, we have to pay t to each of them. There is
also a cost of µ2:2 = 2/3 which is the expected cost of the next round, given
that both agents will be available and we have to pay the highest bid (out of
those two uniform [0, 1] bids) to the lowest bidder. On the other hand, when
we keep one agent alive in cases 2 and 3, that single agent faces no competition
in the next round and will bid Mi = 1 (which we will have to accept). Note
that when we save only one agent, the payment is determined by the second
bid, since we always assume t1 = 1.
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Multiplying the costs by their corresponding probabilities and adding


























Optimizing over the threshold value t, we get t∗ = 1
6




Example 2 (3 agents, 2 rounds). In this example we want to answer the
following questions: “When is it beneficial to keep all three agents alive for
the second round? Also, how does the threshold for picking 2 agents change
compared to the previous example with only 2 agents?”
Let t and t′ be the thresholds for picking 2 and 3 agents in round one,
respectively. Doing the same calculations as in the previous example, we get
the following expected cost function: (we assume that t′ ≤ t, but we can also
calculate the expected cost for the case of t′ > t and check that the optimal

























































) which evaluates to
a cost of 1.49149.
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Observe that in the previous 2 examples, the threshold of saving 2
agents was 1
6
, regardless of whether we started with 2 or 3 agents. In addition,
the expected cost (5.4) has the property that for any t′, the optimal value of
t is 1/6. Also, for any value of t ≥ 1
6
, the cost is minimized at t′ = 1
12
. These
observations lead us to the idea that the optimal thresholds can be calculated
individually, through the following notion of canonical thresholds.
Definition 5.4.1 (Canonical thresholds). The canonical threshold for saving
i agents, denoted by t̂i, is the optimal value for ti when all previous thresholds




s.t. t2 = · · · = ti−1 = 1,
ti+1 = · · · = tn = 0.
(5.5)
In Section 5.5 we show that the canonical thresholds defined above are
indeed optimal thresholds for minimizing the objective function Cn(t2, ..., tn).
To prepare the ground for this result, we first establish some properties of our
objective function. In particular, in Theorem 5.4.1, we calculate the partial
derivative of the objective function with respect to any threshold ti. For this
theorem, we have to define the following notation.
Notation. Recall that we defined the predicate Tk(M1, ...,Mn) = 1 if there
are at least k bids below tk. We define the vector M = (M1, ...,Mn) to be the
vector of all private values and we write Tk(M) = 1, or for short Tk = 1, if the
kth predicate is satisfied. Otherwise, we write Tk = 0.
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Given that the first i bids are below ti (hence predicate i is satisfied),
we define Pi,n as the probability that the remaining bids are above ti so as not
to satisfy any higher predicate (Ti+1, ..., Tn). More precisely, we define
Pi,n = Pr
[
Mi+1, ...,Mn > ti, Ti+1 = ... = Tn = 0 |M1, ...,Mi ≤ ti
]
, (5.6)
where we assume Pn,n = 1 (since higher bids/thresholds do not exist for this
case). An important property that we use in our proofs is that by this defini-
tion, Pi,n is independent of all lower thresholds (t2, ..., ti−1).
Finally, given a vector of all private values M, we define g(M, t2, ..., tn)
to be the total cost of the mechanism using thresholds t2, ..., tn. This total
cost consists of a deterministic cost for the current round (since the bids are
given by M) and an expected cost for the future round(s). With our earlier
notation, Cn(t2, ..., tn) = EM[g(M, t2, ..., tn)]. We are now ready to calculate
the partial derivative of the objective function.























5To be precise, we need to put limε→0 in the right-hand side of equation (5.7), but we
omit the limit for brevity, keeping in mind that ε is a small enough constant.
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We differ the full proof to Appendix C.5. Here we provide some in-
tuition on different parts of this expression. Roughly speaking, the cost
Cn(t2, ..., tn) is determined by the “active” threshold, which corresponds to
the highest predicate that is satisfied. As long as we do not change the active
threshold, perturbing the remaining thresholds should not change the cost,
therefore the derivative should be zero with respect to them. When we think
of the derivative with respect to a particular ti, we want to know how much the
cost would increase/decrease if we change ti to ti + ε. There are two scenarios
where this perturbation changes the cost:







i in (5.7). We also want the remaining bids to
be above ti in a way that higher predicates are not satisfied (so that ti
is active), which is captured by Pi,n. Finally in this case, when we add
ε to ti, all those i agents receive ε more payment, which corresponds to
the multiplicative term i in (5.7).
2. The second scenario is when ti becomes active after we add ε to it. This







i−1f(ti). We again need the remaining bids to be above ti + ε
and to not satisfy any higher predicate (Pi,n). The change in the cost
is more complicated in this scenario. We know that at ti + ε we are
going to save i agents and therefore the cost would be roughly i× ti for
this round, and µ2:i for the next round. However, it is not clear how
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many agents we were saving at ti. That is why we have the expectation
of the cost with negative sign, while the expectation is conditioned to
this particular scenario in which there are exactly i− 1 agents with bids
below ti.
5.5 Optimality of Canonical Thresholds
In this section, we study the optimality of the canonical thresholds. We
first begin by showing that canonical thresholds form a monotone decreasing
sequence. While this property seems intuitive, it is not necessarily true if the
underlying distribution F does not satisfy our two assumptions of regularity
and diminishing returns property of the second-order statistic, discussed in
Section 5.3. See Appendix C.4 for an example of an irregular distribution F ,
for which the optimal thresholds are non-monotone.
Lemma 5.5.1. For a regular distribution F that its second order statistic has
the diminishing returns property (Definition 5.3.5), the canonical thresholds
are monotone non-increasing and independent of the number of agents n.
Proof. By definition, t̂i is the optimal value for ti when t2 = · · · = ti−1 = 1 and
ti+1 = · · · = tn = 0. To find the optimal ti, we start from the general expression
(5.7) for the derivative and show that it simplifies as follows whenever ti ≤ ti−1
(which is true here since ti−1 = 1). When the i
th bid is between ti and ti + ε,
Ti = ... = Tn = 0, and ti ≤ ti−1, we would save i − 1 agents and therefore
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i + F (ti)
i−1f(ti)
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Other than the trivial roots ti = 0 and ti = 1 (which are local maximizers),




= µ2:i−1 − µ2:i. (5.9)
Therefore, we have t̂i ≥ t̂j for all i ≤ j, since the left-hand side is a mono-
tone increasing function and the right-hand side is a constant, monotone non-
increasing in i. Also note that (5.9) makes t̂i independent of n (as long as
n ≥ i). This concludes the proof.
Now, we prove that the canonical thresholds provide the global optimal
solution for minimizing the expected cost of the auction. In Lemma 5.5.2 we
show that when the previous thresholds are set to 1, as we increase threshold
ti from zero to its canonical value t̂i, the expected cost Cn(t2, ..., tn) decreases;
and as we increase ti beyond t̂i, the cost increases again.
Lemma 5.5.2. If tk = 1 for all k ≤ i− 1, then ∂∂tiC(t2, ..., tn) is non-positive
for ti ∈ (0, t̂i), zero at ti = t̂i, and non-negative for ti ∈ (t̂i, 1).7
6For consistency of notation, we define µ2:1 = 1. This is because when we save i agents
in round one, the expected cost of the second round would be µ2:i for i ≥ 2, and 1 if i = 1.
7Note that whenever ti−1 = 1, the previous thresholds t2, ..., ti−2 are irrelevant. There-
fore, this lemma holds even if we only had ti−1 = 1. However, we state the lemma as is for
the sake of the next lemma.
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Proof. Since ti−1 = 1, we can again use the simplified version of the derivative
(5.8) instead of the general version (5.7) for all ti. Since Pi,n, F (ti), and
f(ti) are all non-negative, we have to show that ti +
F (ti)
f(ti)
+ µ2:i − µ2:i−1 is
non-positive for ti ∈ (0, t̂i), zero at ti = t̂i, and non-negative for ti ∈ (t̂i, 1).








+ µ2:i − µ2:i−1 is strictly negative/positive at 0/1, therefore t̂i is
a fractional point.)
The previous lemma shows that the canonical threshold t̂i is the global
minimizer of the cost when t2 = ... = ti−1 = 1, independent of the values of
the remaining thresholds ti+1, ..., tn. However, in the following lemma and its
corollary, we show that this holds even if we lower the value of the previous
thresholds from 1 to their canonical values.
Lemma 5.5.3. If tk = t̂k for all k ≤ i− 1, then ∂∂tiC(t2, ..., tn) is non-positive
for ti ∈ (0, t̂i), zero at ti = t̂i, and non-negative for ti ∈ (t̂i, 1).
Proof. Note that compared to the previous lemma, we only lowered the value of
t2, ..., ti−1 from 1 to their canonical value tk = t̂k. One can argue from (5.7) that
this lowering of thresholds does not change the derivative for any ti ∈ [0, t̂i−1].
This is true because we can use equation (5.8) in this region, which shows
that the derivative is independent of t2, ..., ti−1, whenever ti ≤ ti−1 (remember
that Pi,n is independent of t2, ..., ti−1). Figure 5.2 shows an example of how




∂ti Cn (1,...,1,ti, ti+ 1, . . . , tn )
∂
∂ti Cn (
̂t2, . . . , ̂ti− 1, ti, ti+ 1, . . . , tn )




Figure 5.2: Derivative of the cost with respect to ti when: (blue) the previous
thresholds are set to one, (red) the previous thresholds are lowered to their canonical
values.
Note that from Lemma 5.5.1 we know that t̂i ≤ t̂i−1. This immediately
implies that ∂
∂ti
C(t2, ..., tn) is non-positive for ti ∈ (0, t̂i), zero at ti = t̂i, and
non-negative for ti ∈ (t̂i, t̂i−1). Therefore, we only need to show that the
derivative is non-negative for ti ≥ t̂i−1. To do this, we show that the lowering
of thresholds t2, ..., ti−1 indeed increases the derivative in this region, i.e.,
∂
∂ti
C(t̂2, ..., t̂i−1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) ≥
∂
∂ti
C(1, ..., 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn), ∀ti ≥ t̂i−1
(5.10)
which implies the non-negativity of the derivative, since the right hand side
is non-negative due to Lemma 5.5.2. To prove (5.10), note that from (5.7),
comparing the above two derivatives is equivalent to showing that
EM
[




g(M, 1, ..., 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) | A
]
,
where A is the event that there are exactly i− 1 bids below ti and we save at
most those i − 1 agents. Note that this expected cost is exactly equal to the
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situation if we had only i − 1 agents in the auction, and we knew that their
bids are upper bounded by ti. In other words, it suffices to show that
C̃i−1(t̂2, ..., t̂i−1) ≤ C̃i−1(1, ..., 1), (5.11)
where C̃i−1 is the expected cost in a game with i− 1 agents with distribution
F̃ which is obtained from truncating F to have the support [0, ti] (note that
distribution F̃ only applies to the first day, and on day 2 the bids are again
drawn according to the original distribution F ).
To show (5.11), we use the following set of inequalities:
C̃i−1(t̂2, t̂3, t̂4, ..., t̂i−1) ≤ C̃i−1(1, t̂3, t̂4, ..., t̂i−1)
C̃i−1(1, t̂3, t̂4, ..., t̂i−1) ≤ C̃i−1(1, 1, t̂4, ..., t̂i−1)
...
C̃i−1(1, 1, ..., 1, t̂i−1) ≤ C̃i−1(1, 1, ..., 1, 1)
Each of the above inequalities is implied by Lemma 5.5.2, since this lemma
says that the derivative with respect to any tk is non-negative for tk ≥ t̂k, as
long as the previous thresholds are all equal to one. Therefore, increasing any
tk from t̂k to 1 cannot decrease the cost. The only concern here is that the
thresholds t̂k were calculated for the auction with n agents and distribution F ,
while we are using the same thresholds here for the auction with i− 1 agents
and truncated distribution F̃ . The reason why we are allowed to do this is
that neither changing the number of agents nor truncating the distribution can
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+ µ2:k − µ2:k−1 = 0
In addition to being independent of n, this equation is invariant to conditioning












, which implies having tk = t̂k (for k = 2, ..., i − 1) gives a
lower cost compared to tk = 1, regardless of having distribution F or F̃ .
8
Since we showed that the derivative (with respect to ti) is non-positive
up to t̂i and non-negative afterwards, we arrive at the optimality of t̂i.
Corollary 5.5.4. If tk = t̂k for all k ≤ i− 1, then Cn(t2, ..., tn) is minimized
at ti = t̂i, independent of the values of the remaining thresholds ti+1, ..., tn.
So far we showed that as long as the previous thresholds are set to their
canonical values, t̂i is the global optimal value for ti. To achieve the global
optimal values for the entire set of thresholds (tk, k = 2, ..., n) it suffices to use
the previous lemma in an inductive manner.
8This is similar to revenue maximization where if we condition F to be above a certain
value v and obtain the conditional distribution F̃ , we have that 1 − F̃ (x) = 1−F (x)1−F (v) and
f̃(x) = f(x)1−F (v) . This implies that the inverse hazard rate and as a result the virtual value
functions of these distributions remain the same.
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Theorem 5.5.5. If distribution F satisfies the regularity condition (Defini-
tion 5.3.3), and its second order statistic has the diminishing returns property
(Definition 5.3.5), then the global optimal thresholds that minimize Cn(t2, ..., tn)
are
t∗k = t̂k, ∀k.
Proof. Let us assume that this is not true and there exists another set of
thresholds (t′2, ..., t
′
n) with cost smaller than Cn(t̂2, ..., t̂n). Looking at t2, Corol-
lary 5.5.4 can be used without any condition on the remaining thresholds,
which immediately implies that either t′2 = t̂2, or we can change it to t̂2
without increasing the cost. Given t′2 = t̂2, we can now use this argument
again for t3 and conclude that t
′





n) = Cn(t̂2, ..., t̂n), which contradicts our starting assumption.
5.6 Extensions
Our results extend to several generalizations, as long as the agents
remain homogeneous. In particular, the following extensions hold individually
or in combination with the others:
Symmetric capacities. Throughout this paper we assumed that each agent
is able to meet the entire demand, or equivalently there are no capacities on the
agents. However, in practice we can have the constraint that the assignments
should satisfy xi ≤ xi, where xi is the capacity of agent i. We argue that our
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results hold if the agents have the same capacity, i.e., xi = x for all i. To see
this, let m = d1/xe be the minimum number of agents that we need to keep in
all rounds. To guarantee that we meet the demand on day 2, we have to set
t2 = ... = tm = 1 in day 1. For the remaining thresholds tk (k > m), note that
if we save k agents from day 1 to day 2, the expected cost on day 2 would be
m× µm+1:k. Therefore, similarly to (5.9), the optimal value of tk is where the
virtual cost matches the savings of having k agents versus having k−1 agents,
i.e., tk + F (tk)/f(tk) = m(µm+1:k−1 − µm+1:k). Note that in this case we need
the (m + 1)-st order statistics to satisfy the diminishing returns property of
Definition 5.3.5.
Changing distributions. Note that the analysis of our threshold algorithm
did not use the fact that the distribution in each round was the same. Let F1
and F2 be the distributions for the overhead costs for day 1 and 2 respectively.




= µ2:i−1 − µ2:i. (5.12)
where µ is defined according to the order statistics of F2. As long as the reg-
ularity condition holds for F1, and F2 has the diminishing returns property of
the second order statistic, our theorem still holds since our proof only requires
that µ2:i−1 − µ2:i is a decreasing function of i.
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Non-zero service costs. Assume that the agents incur a cost of c1 and c2
for providing a unit of demand on day 1 and 2, respectively (but still have
the same cost as other agents each round). In this case, the definition of
a threshold mechanism changes slightly compared to Definition 5.3.1. After
finding the highest predicate Tk that is satisfied, the first k agents with lowest
bids are allocated an assignment of xi = 1/k, while receiving a payment of
p·xi, except that the payment now increases to p = k·min{tk,Mk+1}+c (where
c is the service cost of the corresponding day). This is required to ensure that
for any agent with strictly positive allocation we have xi(p− ci) ≥Mi.
Now we argue that the canonical thresholds are still optimal for the
case of non-zero costs. This is because any feasible allocation will result in an
additional cost of
∑
i xi · c = c to the mechanism designer. As a result, the
optimal threshold mechanism for non-zero service cost (c > 0) corresponds
to designing the optimal mechanism for c = 0, and adding the cost c to the
payment rate p so as to ensure that the utilities of the agents are the same.
This shows that our assumption of cji = 0 (for all i, j) throughout the paper
was without loss of generality.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied a dynamic procurement auction for n sym-
metric agents. We assumed 3 different properties for the agents that were
crucial to achieve the optimality of the canonical thresholds: (i) we assumed
a common distribution F for the overhead costs, (ii) we assumed that the
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per-unit cost of providing the service is the same for all agents, and (iii) we as-
sumed that each agent can provide the entire demand. Relaxing any of these
assumptions breaks the symmetry of the agents and opens a new research
question for future work.
If we assume a different distribution Fi for each agent’s overhead cost,
then the savings from allocating the service to k agents and having them par-
ticipate in the future rounds depend on the identity of those agents. This could
potentially lead to having a different threshold for any subset of agents, which
would make the problem computationally intractable. On the other hand, if
we assume that agents have different per-unit costs, the optimal assignment
would not be trivial, even if the set of agents with non-zero assignments are
known. In other words, if we want to save a particular set of k agents, the
optimal assignment is not necessarily 1/k, and it depends on the per-unit costs
of those particular k agents. The same challenge holds when we consider dif-
ferent capacities for the agents, as equal assignments of 1/k may not even be





Missing Proof from Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 2.5.3: The summation of supermodular set functions is
supermodular, so we only need to prove the supermodularity for a fixed edge
{i, j} ∈ E . We can also drop positive constants like Rij. Define fij(A) and















We now prove that fij(A) is supermodular. A similar proof works for f
′
ij(A).
We want to show that:
fij(A ∪ {e})− fij(A) ≤ fij(B ∪ {e})− fij(B), (A.1)
for every A ⊆ B ⊆ E , e ∈ E , and e 6∈ B. For any k, let akij be the change in
zkij when we add e to A, i.e.:
akij = z
k
ij(A ∪ {e})− zkij(A),
where zkij(A) is just z
k
ij, calculated based on the edges in A. Similarly, let b
k
ij be
defined for B and B ∪{e}. We have akij ≤ bkij, because any new path in A cre-
ated by adding e is also a new path in B. Another fact is that zkij(A) ≤ zkij(B),
because adding more edges cannot decrease the number of paths between any
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pair of vertices (i.e., f(A) is a monotone increasing function). Now we prove
(A.1):






































































=fij(A ∪ {e})− fij(A). (A.8)
In (A.3), (A.4) we just applied the definitions of fij and b
k
ij, respectively. In
(A.4), the aggregate coefficient of z0ji(B) is positive, so using the fact that
z0ji(B) ≥ z0ji(A), we get (A.5). To get (A.6), note that quadratic function
(x+α)2−x2 < (y+α)2−y2 for x < y and fixed α > 0. Setting α = ∑k∈N bkijpk,
and the fact that zkij(A) ≤ zkij(B) implies (A.6). Finally, (A.7) is implied by











therefore f(A) is supermodular.
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Appendix B
Missing Proofs from Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Laplacian Update (Lemma 3.4.3)
Let e be the edge chosen for deletion. Observe that deleting e from G
results in a rank-one update to L:






since L = BCBT . To use Lemma 3.4.2, we need to show that
√
ceχe ∈ im(L)
and 1− ceχTe L†χe 6= 0 (as L ∈ Rn×n is symmetric). First, since C is a positive
definite matrix we can write L = BCBT = (BC1/2)(BC1/2)T . Let U = BC1/2
and u =
√
ceχe. By construction u is a column of U , which implies that
u ∈ im(U). Furthermore, since im(U) = im(UUT ), it follows that u is also in
im(UUT ) = im(L).1 We further claim that 1 − ceχTe L†χe 6= 0. To see this,
suppose 1− ceχTe L†χe = 0. This implies χTe L†χe = 1/ce or Reff(e) = re, which
happens if and only if e is a bridge, which contradicts the assumption that
G′ was connected. Now, applying the pseudoinverse update formula given in
Lemma 3.4.2 yields the result.
1For any matrix A ∈ Rm×n, we have im(A) = im(AAT ) (see for example Theorem A.25
in [66]).
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B.2 Proof of Energy Update (Lemma 3.4.4)
Remember that Gk and Gk+1 are connected by assumption. Therefore,
using Lemma 3.4.3 we have:
(Lk+1)





























where we used the fact that fk = CkB
T
k φk (i.e. fk(e) = ceχ
T
e φk) in the last
equality. By connectivity and feasibility assumptions we know that b ∈ im(Lk)
and χe ∈ im(Lk). This implies that Lkφk = b and similarly, LkL†kχe = χe.
Then, using these facts and recalling from preliminaries that E(fk+1) = bTφk+1,
we have













where (a) follows from the fact that Lkφk = b and (b) from LkL
†
kχe = χe.




Here we discuss the extensions of our results for the distribution net-
work reconfiguration problem to the case of stochastic demands. Throughout
Chapter 3 we assumed that the demands (di) are known and our goal is to
find the spanning tree that feeds these demands with the smallest possible loss.
However in reality, we may only have access to an estimate of the demand (or
its prior distribution) if we are planning ahead for the optimal configuration.
Another reason to consider stochastic demands is the actual computation time
of finding such optimal configuration. Since the demand changes over time and
if the computation time of the optimal spanning tree is not negligible, we may
end up with a spanning tree whose loss is not optimal (or approximately op-
timal) for the current set of demands.
Fortunately, many of the results from Chapter 3 still hold for the case of
stochastic demands. This includes theO(m−n) approximation factor from the
RIDe algorithm (Theorem 3.4.1), O(n) approximation factor of shortest path
trees (Theorem 3.5.1), and O(√n) approximation factor for the grids with
uniform resistances (Corollary 3.5.3). In fact, none of the previous results
requires knowledge of the actual demands in order to find an approximately
optimal spanning tree. In RIDe algorithm, we delete edges randomly based
on the effective resistances which are independent of the demands. Similarly,
shortest path trees are obtained with respect to the edge resistances. Finally
in Theorem 3.5.2 and Corollary 3.5.3, after finding a family of cuts that are
not too big, the proposed solution is any spanning tree whose edges carry flows
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only towards outside of the cuts.
The only algorithm whose performance may be affected by the stochas-
ticity of the demands is the Min-Min algorithm. Remember that even in the
case of non-uniform demands (Theorem 3.6.6), the Min-Min tree would be
constructed from the uniform counterpart of the instance. Therefore, we can
still run the same algorithm in the case of stochastic demands, and we only
need to check how its approximation factor changes based on the accuracy of
our demand estimation. Assume that instead of having the actual demand for
each vertex (di), we have access to an estimate of the demand, denoted by d̂i.
Also consider a global parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) that measures the accuracy of our
estimation. In particular, we assume that the actual demand for each node
(di) is drawn from a distribution Fi that is supported on [d̂i(1− δ), d̂i(1 + δ)].
We have the following result on the performance of the Min-Min algorithm.
Theorem B.3.1. Let d̂i be the estimate of the demand of node i in a rectan-
gular n×m (n ≤ m) grid with uniform resistances, where the actual demand
di is drawn from a distribution Fi supported on [d̂i(1−δ), d̂i(1+δ)]. Let d̂min =
mini∈V \{r} d̂i and d̂max = maxi∈V \{r} d̂i. Then the Min-Min algorithm gives an








, where α = d̂max/d̂min.
Note that the only difference with Theorem 3.6.6 is the additional (1+δ
1−δ )
2
term. The bigger δ means that our estimates are less accurate, and hence we
get a weaker (larger) approximation factor.
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Appendix C
Missing Material from Chapter 5
C.1 Bid-oblivious vs Bid-sensitive Mechanisms
In this section, we show an example of how bid-sensitive mechanisms
can achieve a lower cost compared to bid-oblivious mechanisms. Remember
that our threshold mechanisms determine the number of agents that serve
the demand in a dynamic way, after observing the bids. On the other hand,
bid-oblivious mechanisms determine this number a-priori, before the bids are
submitted.
Example 3 (Bid-oblivious mechanism). Consider 2 rounds and n agents with
overhead costs drawn from the uniform distribution, Mi ∼ U [0, 1]. We only
have to decide on the number of agents to be saved from round 1 to round 2.
If we save 1 agent, the expected cost would be 2
n+1
for round 1, which is the
expected value of the second lowest bid out of n i.i.d. uniform bids in [0, 1].
However, in that case, there will be no competition in round 2, and we have
to pay the upper-bound of the distribution (which is 1) to the single agent left
in round 2. On the other hand, if we saved 2 agents in round 1, the expected
cost for that round would be 2× 3
n+1
, because each of the agents gets the third
lowest bid. We also have to pay 2/3 in expectation in round 2. Comparing
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the two cases ( 2
n+1




), we conclude that it is beneficial to
save 2 agents if there are more than n = 11 agents initially. Similarly, we can
compute the number of agents that justify saving 3,4,... agents.
Example 4 (Bid-oblivious vs bid-sensitive). Consider 2 rounds and 2 agents
with uniform [0, 1] distribution for overhead costs. According to the previous
example, the bid-oblivious mechanism would save only 1 agent in the first
round, and therefore pay a total cost of 2
3
+ 1 in expectation. However, by
setting a threshold of t2 =
1
6




C.2 Dealing with Ties
Allowing for ties in the bids introduces some slight technicalities which
we present in the updated definition and proof of truthfulness of our mechanism
below.
Definition C.2.1. A single threshold mechanism using thresholds t1, . . . , tn ∈
[0, 1] is defined as follows: Assume M1 ≤ M2 ≤ · · · ≤ Mn and let us define
the predicate Tk(M1, . . . ,Mn) = 1 if and only if Mk ≤ tk, in other words the
kth smallest value is less than the kth threshold. Let k be the highest index








and the payment to agent i is xi · p, where p is the total mechanism pay-
ment (also the per unit cost of providing the demand) defined as p = ` ·
min{tk,Mk+1}.
Proposition C.2.1. Any threshold mechanism is truthful in the corresponding
single-shot game and each agent that has non-zero allocation has non-negative
utility.
Proof. If an agent i is not allocated the service, she receives utility of −∞.
Bidding a lower overhead cost may result in her being allocated some part of
the demand. There are two scenarios in which this may happen: (1) If there
exists some k such that Tk is the highest true predicate both before and after
agent i lowered her bid. In this case, it must be that her lower bid is less than
or equal to Mk, which is strictly less than Mi since if Mi = Mk then agent
i should have been allocated. This results in a payment equal to Mk, which
makes her utility −∞ again. (2) If Tk is not the highest true predicate after
agent i lowers her bid. Assume that the new highest predicate satisfied is Tw
for some w > k. Since Tw was not true before, it must be that the threshold
tw is now the critical value, therefore each agent receives payment equal to tw.
But since Tw was false before, we know that tw < Mi, meaning that agent i
will receive −∞ utility.
If agent i is allocated the service, notice that her payment is indepen-
dent of her actual overhead cost. Reporting a lower overhead cost does not
change her allocation nor payment. Similarly, if she reports a higher amount,
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she will receive the same payment, as long as she is still being allocated the
service. If her increase makes her not being allocated, then her utility be-
comes −∞. In neither case is deviating from reporting the true overhead cost
profitable.
C.3 Distributional Assumptions
Throughout the paper, we assumed two important properties for the
underlying distribution F : (i) we assumed that the virtual cost is monotone
increasing, and (ii) we assumed that the second order statistics have the dimin-
ishing returns property, µ2:n−1 − µ2:n ≥ µ2:n − µ2:n+1. One sufficient condition
for (i) is that F is log-concave. For (ii), we can show that: (see for example,
[146])








[F (x)]r[1− F (x)]n−rdx. (C.2)
Therefore, we have to show that the above expression is monotone decreasing
in n, for r = 2. Since the above integral is hard to compute for arbitrary
distributions F , here we show numerically that many distributions satisfy this
property. We also compute the above integral for polynomial distributions and
show theoretically that they satisfy both of our assumptions.
Figure C.1-(left) shows a truncated normal distribution with µ = 0.8
and σ = 0.1 (i.e., this is a probability distribution derived from a normal
distribution N (µ, σ2) by bounding the random variable between 0 and 1).
Figure C.1-(middle) shows the marginal decrease in the second order statistic
as we increase the number of samples from n to n + 1, i.e., µ2:n − µn+1. As
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Figure C.1: Regularity of a truncated normal distribution with µ = 0.8 and σ = 0.1:
(Left) Distribution F , (Middle) Marginals of second order statistic, (Right) Virtual
cost function.
Figure C.2: Regularity of the polynomial distribution with exponent p = 2: (Left)
Distribution F (x) = x2, (Middle) Marginals of second order statistic, (Right) Vir-
tual cost function.
we can see, the marginal change diminishes as we have more samples. Finally,
Figure C.1-(right) shows the virtual cost which confirms its monotonicity.
Figures C.2, C.3 confirm our distributional assumptions for a polyno-
mial distribution F (x) = xp, where p > 0. Figure C.2 corresponds to the
case of p = 2, meaning that the CDF is a quadratic function, F (x) = x2; and
Figure C.3 corresponds to p = 1/2, meaning that F (x) =
√
x. Note that for
polynomial distributions, since f(x) = pxp−1, we have F (x)
f(x)
= x/p, which is
164
Figure C.3: Regularity of the polynomial distribution with exponent p = 1/2: (Left)
Distribution F (x) =
√
x, (Middle) Marginals of second order statistic, (Right) Vir-
tual cost function.
Figure C.4: Regularity of beta distribution with shape parameters α = 2 and β = 5:
(Left) Distribution F (x) = Ix(α, β), where I denotes the regularized incomplete
beta function, (Middle) Marginals of second order statistic, (Right) Virtual cost
function.
why the virtual costs are linear in both figures.
Finally, Figure C.4 shows a beta distribution for which we have f(x) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1 Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
, where Γ is the Gamma function. For this figure we
have the shape parameters set to α = 2 and β = 5.
We now prove that polynomial distributions satisfy the distributional
assumptions needed for our results.
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Theorem C.3.1 (polynomial distributions). For any distribution F (x) =
xp, x ∈ [0, 1], p > 0 we have:
(a) x+ F (x)
f(x)
is monotone increasing.
(b) µr:n−1 − µr:n is monotone decreasing in n for any r.
Proof. First, x + F (x)
f(x)
= x + x
p
pxp−1
= x(1 + 1
p
) which is monotone increasing.
For the second part, using equation (C.2), we have:














Γ(n+ 1− r)Γ(r + 1
p
)





where Γ is the Gamma function, and satisfies Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z). Comparing
this expression with the same expression for µr:n − µr:n+1, we need to show
that:
(n− 1)!
(r − 1)!(n− r)! ×
Γ(n+ 1− r)Γ(r + 1
p
)





(r − 1)!(n+ 1− r)! ×
Γ(n+ 2− r)Γ(r + 1
p
)












n+ 1− r ×
Γ(n+ 2− r)
Γ(n+ 1− r) .
Now using the above-mentioned property of the Gamma function Γ(z + 1) =
zΓ(z), notice that the left hand side is equal to n + 1 + 1/p, while the right
hand side is equal to n; therefore, the inequality is true for any p > 0.
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C.4 Non-monotone Example
Here we give an example where the global optimal thresholds are non-
monotone, in particular for this example t∗2 < t
∗
3. We proved via Lemma 5.5.1
and Theorem 5.5.5 that this cannot happen if the underlying distribution F
satisfies our two assumptions of regularity (Definition 5.3.3) and diminishing
returns of order statistics (Definition 5.3.5). In fact, the distribution F in the
following example fails both of these assumptions. It has a point mass proba-
bility which breaks the monotonicity of the virtual cost, and more importantly,
its second order statistic does not have the diminishing returns property. More
precisely, the savings of having the 3rd agent participating in the second day
(µ2:2−µ2:3) is more than the savings from the 2nd agent (1−µ2:2). This makes
the buyer want to save the 3rd agent even at a higher value than he is willing
to pay for the 2nd agent.
Example 5 (Non-monotone thresholds). Consider a distribution F that is
U [0, 1
2










where X ∼ U [0, 1
2
]. Now suppose we have three agents with overhead costs
drawn independently from F . If we save 1, 2, or 3 agents, the expected cost we
incur on day 2 would be 1, µ2:2 =
5
6




















which show that the optimal thresholds can be non-monotone (t∗3 > t
∗
2), if we
do not have constraints on the underlying distribution F .
C.5 Proof of Theorem 5.4.1






EM [g(M, t2, ..., tn)] = EM
[






Pr(Tj = 1, Tj+1 = ... = Tn = 0)EM
[
∂g(M, t2, ..., tn)
∂ti
| Tj = 1, Tj+1 = ... = Tn = 0
]
+ Pr(Ti = ... = Tn = 0)EM
[
∂g(M, t2, ..., tn)
∂ti
| Ti = ... = Tn = 0
]
(C.4)
Note that for j ≥ i + 1, the derivative (and therefore the conditional ex-
pectation) is zero because we save at least i + 1 agents and the payment is
independent of ti. For j = i, if the (i + 1)
th bid (i.e., Mi+1:n) is more than ti,
then we have g(M, t2, ..., tn) = i× ti + µ2:i, and hence
EM
[
∂g(M, t2, ..., tn)
∂ti
| Ti = 1, Ti+1 = ... = Tn = 0,Mi+1:n > ti
]
= i.
In addition, the corresponding probability of such an event is



















For the case of Ti = ... = Tn = 0, we save at most i−1 agents and the derivative
of the cost with respect to ti is zero, unless there is a bid in (ti, ti + ε) such
that increasing ti by ε makes Ti = 1. In this special case we use the fact that:




g(M, t2, ..., ti + ε, ..., tn)− g(M, t2, ..., ti, ..., tn)
ε
.
Note that this derivative would be infinity as we have a sudden increase in g,
however the probability of this event is proportional to ε which makes a finite
product. In particular, we have:



















In this case, g(M, t2, ..., ti + ε, ..., tn) = i× (ti + ε) +µ2:i. Even though the cost
g(M, t2, ..., ti, ..., tn) depends on the thresholds t2, ..., ti and the realization of
the bids, its expectation is independent of the number of agents n, since we
have already conditioned on the fact that exactly i− 1 bids are below ti (and
the assignment and payments only depend on those i − 1 bids). Putting the
















EM [i× ti + µ2:i − g(M, t2, ..., tn) | Ti = ... = Tn = 0, ti < Mi:n < ti + ε]
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i× ti + µ2:i − g(M, t2, ..., tn) | Ti = ... = Tn = 0, ti < Mi:n < ti + ε
]]
,
which completes the proof.
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